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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the promulgation of various types of conflicts can be 
witnessed across the world. One of the most significant changes is the shift of conflict 
types from “interstate” towards “intrastate”. These conflicts in general are less likely to 
be successful over a quick political settlement due to its protracted and long-term nature. 
Therefore, it is evident that most militarized intrastate conflicts are experiencing some 
sort of conflict management, while mediation and bilateral negotiations being the most 
popular mechanisms (Schneider et.al. 2006: 3). 
 
Mediation is a complex process with challenges which require prudence and in-depth 
knowledge to overcome the difficulties. At the end of the Cold War, one can observe the 
emergence of some new states as active members in conflict resolution. These countries 
approach conflict resolution challenges in a more systematic and dynamic manner than it 
was witnessed previously. They introduced new methodologies and strategies to support 
active political initiatives and decision making. Some countries like Norway, Sweden, 
Finland and Canada,  once considered peripheral players, are considered the best 
mediators in protracted violent conflicts (Kelleher & Taulbee 2006:479). 
 
Norway as a peaceful nation has its own political, social and economic cultural that make 
it quite obvious of their pursuit for international peacemaking. Norway’s social 
democratic structure, their popular support for the foreign policy, the well enriched 
economic status and economic stability of the country, acclaimed economic development 
and cooperation work, NGO partnership in abroad and the foreign policy that favors a 
disengagement of the international military presence are vital conditions for such 
considerations (Waage 2000, Kelleher & Taulbee 2006). Overall, the main geographical 
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characteristic that Norway is a small country and its limited influences in world politics, 
reverently, raised the country’s repute as a ‘positive image’.1  
 
Norway’s attempts in peace making became well known for having provided a shuttle 
diplomacy in the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993 between Israel and the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO). Norway currently engages in various peace attempts in 
different parts of the world - Sudan, Guatemala, Colombia, and Sri Lanka. The economic 
and humanitarian assistance given to Palestine, Haiti and Indonesia are vital activities in 
understanding Norway’s attempt in reconciliation as well (Helgesen 2003:1-7[online]).  
 
At a Belgian/Norwegian seminar Vidar Helgesen, the former State Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs in Norway, held a speech titled “Peace, Mediation, and Reconciliation: The 
Norwegian experiences (Helgesen 2003:1-7[online]). This speech explains the 
importance of Norway’s interests in resolving conflicts and addressing security threats in 
places away from their homeland.  
 
Sri Lanka’s conflict remains vital among Norwegian interests in conflict resolution. The 
Royal Norwegian Government (RNG) formally entered Sri Lanka’s conflict as a 
facilitator in 2001.From then on Norway played an official role in helping the 
Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) find 
a political solution to the ongoing military struggle. The purpose of this thesis is to 
analyze Norway’s role in the facilitation of Sri Lanka’s peace process. The study will 
especially focus on the period of signing the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) in 2002, until 
the end of the second round of Geneva talks in October, 2006. This thesis analyzes the 
strategies in facilitation as one of the foremost mediation forms. The main assumption is 
how third party mediation through facilitation can be successful in brining a negotiated 
                                                 
1
  Hilde Henriksen Waage talks about Norway ‘positive image’ as an international peacemaker. She says that 
“Norway was keen to promote its image as an international peacemaker”. For this matter, Norway as a non-colonial 
country and has little influence on world politics, supports for making a reputation for its image (Waage 2000 
[online]). 
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settlement in an intrastate military conflict. It assumes that facilitation can make positive 
changes between conflicting parties which will result in a peaceful settlement. On this 
basis the thesis will explore Norway’s role as a facilitator in Sri Lanka’s peace process.  
 
In Sri Lanka, Norway was able to bring the GoSL and the LTTE to the bargaining table 
in September2002, in Thailand. There have been six-rounds of peace talks continuously 
until March 2003. Through out the six-rounds of peace talks the Norwegian government, 
who was led by Kjell Magne Bondevik, helped the GoSL and the LTTE to facilitate 
direct negotiations. A number of successful attempts and initiatives took place during 
these eight months. Nevertheless, the peace talks unexpectedly collapsed immediately 
after the LTTE withdrew their participation from the negotiation process. There was not 
much active involvement by the GoSL and the LTTE to restart peace talks until they met 
in Geneva in February 2006. Even though Post-Tsunami Operational Management (P-
TOMS) in June 2005 had brought slight optimism to the peace process, neither the GoSL 
nor the LTTE agreed on common grounds to resume talks. 
 
Norway’s facilitation for the peace process in Sri Lanka, for almost six years, has had its 
ups and downs. Today, after more than five years of signing the Ceasefire Agreement, 
since 2002, the GoSL and the LTTE have preferred the military option, breaching the 
Ceasefire Agreement’s main clause, “find a negotiated solution to the ongoing ethnic 
conflict in Sri Lanka” (CFA  2002 [online]). In January 2008 the government of Sri 
Lanka officially announced the abrogation of the CFA following a bomb explosion.  
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1.2 Defining Facilitation 
 
Facilitation is a mode of mediation.2 In general, it is a voluntary effort of a third party to 
help two or more actors to settle a conflict through agreement. The basic assumption is 
that disputants are incapable of finding an agreement on their own. Hence, the conflicting 
parties seek third party assistance in conflict management (Kleiboer 1996:365; Kemper 
2007:10). The form3 of third party mediation helps to overcome hostility, while showing 
willingness to de-escalate violence and engage into a dialogue (Bercovitch & Houston 
1995:26). The moment, disputants understand the need for a third party involvement, a 
mediator steps into the conflict aiming to assist conflicting parties to find a common 
bargaining space.  
 
The techniques and mechanisms of mediation encompass different outlooks. Facilitation 
is one mode of a common strategy and it holds some distinguishing characteristics. 
Facilitation is dependent on the request of the conflicting parties and it leaves the ultimate 
decision-making power with the disputants (Bercovitch & Houston 1995:26). It is 
understood that the effectiveness of mediation remains within the negotiator’s ability to 
move disputants towards an agreement, or cessation of violence (Schneider et.al. 2006:4).  
 
The main function of facilitation is to communicate between the parties. It includes 
channel service between disputants. A facilitator will look for pieces of information to 
pursue parties for a common bargaining space.4  Broadly speaking a facilitator helps the 
                                                 
2
 The concept of mediation derives it semantic roots from the Latin word “mediare” and entails a non-binding and 
non-coercive intervention by a third party that seeks to change the behavior or attitudes of one or all parties in a 
conflict (Schneider et.al. 2006:3). 
 
3
 Mediation strategies are numerous. Facilitation, Formulation and Manipulation are identified as three main types 
of mediation (Beardsley et.al. 2006). Mediation basically helps parties to find a negotiated solution to the conflict. 
 
4
 According to Beardsley and his fellows (Beardsley et.al. 2006:62) “any bargaining situation actor’s preferences 
orderings should overlap such that some alternatives exits that are preferable to conflict for all involved. This area of 
overlap termed the zone of agreement (ZOA) and it consist of all possible outcomes that would allow each disputant 
to achieve his respective reservation level” (ibid. 2006). 
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disputants to create a conducive environment to reach an agreement (Hopmann 1996:231; 
Beardsley et.al. 2006:63). In fact a facilitator ensures that the disputants have access to all 
necessary information, clarify information, remove misperceptions in the best manner 
and reach the zone of agreement5 to determine an optimal solution. Jacob Bercovitch 
(1995:30) found that communication-facilitation is the most commonly used approach 
amongst many.  
 
A facilitator needs to have renowned reputation and trust among the parties. The 
information conveyed between the conflicting parties develops trust in the facilitator’s 
accountability. It is argued that neutrality of a facilitator largely influences the success of 
the role he has to act. Folberg and Taylor characterize facilitation as a neutral process led 
by a neutral person or persons (Bercovitch & Houston 1995:26), which is identified as 
one of the foremost personal characteristics of strategic behavior.  
 
 
1.3 Historical Background of the Sri Lanka’s Conflict. 
 
This study analyzes the root causes of the two decades old military conflict in Sri Lanka. 
The complex nature of the causes and divided ideologies6 found in the literature has made 
the task complicated and difficult. However, this study considers exploration of vivid 
historical elements and background events leading up to the conflict. 
 
The conflict not merely started due to the division of ethnicity. K.M. De Silva argues (De 
Silva [online]), “The current ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is a much more complex 
                                                 
5
 “Zone of Agreement (ZOA) consists of all possible outcomes that would allow each disputant to achieve his or her 
respective reservation level. Zone of agreement, according to Fisher and Ury call the best alternative to a negotiated 
agreement (BATNA) It is possible to think each crisis actor’s BANTA value as the expected net value of the 
conflict; consequently , the ZOA consists all the set of outcomes that provide all crisis actors with more benefit than 
their BATNA” (Beardsley et.al. 2006:62).  
 
6
 Sinhalese and the Tamils prioritize the conflict interests in different weight. Therefore it is difficult to find a single 
prominent ideology of root causes of the current conflict. In most cases the influence of nationalistic ideologies, 
misperceptions have been the basis for such dividend ideologies.  
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business than a simple straightforward confrontation between a once well-entrenched 
minority, the Sri Lanka Tamils, and a now powerful but still insecure majority, the 
Sinhalese”. It is said the Sinhala majoritarian democracy that took concrete shape 
immediately after Sri Lanka’s political independence in 1948 was to a great extent a 
consequence of the current existing military struggle between the GoSL and the LTTE 
(Uyangoda 2006:9-12). Not only the ethnic differences but also the post-independence 
political, economic, social and cultural changes were reasons for the ethno-nationalistic 
struggle between Sinhalese and Tamils.  
 
Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society with 19 million people (Sinhalese 
74 percent, Tamils, 17 percent and Moors 8 percent). Sinhalese Buddhists are 76.7 
percent. There are 7.8 Tamil Hindus. Both Sinhalese Christians and Tamils Christians 
make up 6.1 percent. The remaining population is Muslims at 8.5 percent. The population 
in the Northern and Eastern part of the country is largely Tamils and some Muslims, 
while Sinhalese are the majority in the rest of the country (Department of Censes and 
Statistics, Sri Lanka 2001[online]). 
 
Sri Lanka gained independence in February 1948 from United Kingdom after one 
hundred and thirty two years of colonial rule.7 The independence movement was non-
violent and peacefully achieved through the gradual exchange of letters between local 
leaders and imperial rulers. The Soulbury Constitution, which was introduced by the 
British conferred powers to the local leaders for the election of the first Sri Lankan 
parliament. At the first election in 1947 D.S. Senanayake who was the leader of the 
United National Party (UNP) became the first Prime Minister of the country. Tamil 
Congress representatives in the first parliament provided a multi-ethnic outset in 
independent Sri Lanka. 
                                                 
7
 British colonial rule followed by “divide and rule” concept. British have provided legislation participation for the 
locals based on ethnic composition. It is a question that this system of rule of the British increased the ethnic tension 
and emergence of ideological clash between ethnic majority and minority in Sri Lanka.  
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Nevertheless, there was a strong Tamil opinion raised against the Sinhala majoritarian 
parliament for passing two “Citizenship Acts”8 unfavorable to minorities on the island. 
Anton Balasingam who was the chief political advisor to LTTE (Balasingham 2004:7) 
said, “Soon after the independence of the island the Sri Lanka parliament became the 
very instrument of majoritarian tyranny where racism reigned supreme and repressive 
laws enacted against minority communities (ibid.). ” According to K.M. De Silva, a 
prominent historian in Sri Lanka- the Citizenship Acts passed as there was an emerging 
trepidation in Sinhala leaders’ mind of the possible escalation of Tamil power. With 
thoughts of Tamil power leading to Indian domination on the island and the consideration 
of plantation workers and their strength as an additional source of power to the 
indigenous Tamils (De Silva [online]).  
Anxiety and feeling of insecurity in the every day life of Tamils has gradually developed 
in post-independent Sri Lanka. S.J.V Chelvanayagam who was the founder of Federal 
Party and considered as a prophetic leader of the Tamils, proposed a federal form of 
government as a solution to the Tamils, “The unchangeable title to nationhood and the 
right to political autonomy and federal union with Sinhalese (Chandrakanthan 2006:33)”. 
Some argue that the actions taken by the Tamil leaders were unproductive in establishing 
a hard-line opinion to protect Tamil rights. The “Sinhala Only Act” passed in 1956 by the 
government of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike was a blow against the Tamil speaking 
population. The act is considered by large number of Tamils as a deliberate action to 
curtail the private and public sector employment opportunities (Chandrakanthan 
2006:34). It was argued, that the Act was aimed to reduce the number of English schools 
                                                 
8
  The “Citizenship Act” in 1948 and “Indo- Pakistan Citizenship Act” in 1949 made Tamil leaders in the parliament 
detach from the national government and promote anti-Sinhala propaganda. This act mainly focused on granting 
citizenship for Tamil laborers, whom largely migrated during British colonial time. After these Acts many Tamil 
laborers have to flew from the country as they were not granted the citizenship. Some were rejected of giving the 
citizenship and were countinued work in the plantation. Even though some Tamil leaders claimed for Tamil – labors 
rights, the government in power were failed to act according to the basis of equal rights (Wakkumbura 2007:56-57). 
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and encourage national schools in the education systems and to encourage the national 
lanuage skills among the population.   
Sri Lanka’s first sovereign constitution came into force in 1972 under Prime Minister 
S.Bandaranaike. This constitution introduced some dramatic changes in the legal status of 
language and religion in the country. The new constitution reaffirmed Sinhala as the only 
official language and conferred a special status to Buddhism.9 Subsequently the second 
sovereign constitution in 1978 recognized both Sinhala and Tamil as official languages 
and Buddhism as the state’s foremost religion.10 The constitutional changes, which 
prioritized the Sinhala language and Buddhism, were not acceptable to the Tamils. Anton 
Balasingham (2004:19) claims, “The constitution creating a Sinhala-Buddhist autocratic 
state structure failed to address the political aspirations of the Tamil people”. The 
formation of Tamil military youth groups changed the status quo of the country resulting 
in armed fighting. There were several Tamil groups standing for the rights of Tamils at 
that period. Added to that Jeyaratnam Wilson argues the Tamil United Front, which was 
formed in 1976 subsequently renamed as Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) initiated 
a “freedom struggle for a Tamil sovereign state” (Liyanage 2005:137). Creating a united 
Tamil ideology for a national level political process has been also problematic in Sri 
Lanka’s politics.  
Not merely the Tamil militia but also the Sinhala radical movements distorted and dented 
the peaceful nature of the country. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP-People’s 
Liberation Front) a Sinhalese radical movement, inspired by educated Sinhala youths has 
been a vocal brand of patriotism and Sinhala-Buddhist majoritarianism. They fought for 
a radical shift of state politics opposed to the Tamil claim for a separate state (Rampton & 
Welikala 2005:28-33). JVP which is now engaged in national politics still holds the 
                                                 
9
 The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (1972) Chapter III refers the status of language and 
Chapter II refers to status of Buddhism. 
 
10
 The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (1978) Chapter IV explains the status of 
language and Chapter II refers the status of Buddhism. 
 
 15 
notion that the LTTE as an undemocratic, unrepresentative, illegitimate and 
unaccountable terrorist organization that violates human rights (ibid.47). It is argued that 
the strong and the rigid hostile views of the JVP party and recently established Jathika 
Hela Urumaya (JHU- National Sinhala Heritage) against the LTTE is an obstacle against 
finding a peaceful settlement to the growing military struggle in the country. 
Since 198311 to date, both GoSL and LTTE are ruthlessly fighting for a military victory 
causing a large number of deaths and property damages. The contemporary military 
struggle does not only affect Sri Lanka but also the international system.  
 
1.4 Historical Background of the Peace Processes  
The examination of the background within the peace process provides an idea as to, how 
GoSL and LTTE look at solving the ethnic problem with or without third party assistance 
in several occasions. A careful observation of literature made the study easy to gather 
most important events at several phases in Sri Lanka. It is worth while to note that the 
following events turn into different outlooks under different governments in Sri Lanka’s 
political setting.    
The political decision making of the Sinhala-Tamil ‘ethnic question’ drew back to the 
immediate history of post-independence when Prime Minister S.W.R.D Bandaranaike 
(1956-1959) signed an agreement in 1957 with S.J.V. Chelvanayagam who was the 
leader of Federal Party.12 Thereafter the Dudley-Chelvanayagam pact was signed in 
1965. Both 1957 and 1965 pacts were heavily opposed by general politics and resulted in 
no progress. 
                                                 
11
 In 1983 communal riots broke out in Colombo (the capital of Sri Lanka) when 13 army soldiers of GoSL were 
killed in an ambush by the LTTE in the North. Large number of Tamils was killed and as a result Tamil insurgency 
grown into a full-blown war. LTTE began their military offense aftermath the 1983 “Black July” resulting a war 
situation between the LTTE and the GoSL forces.  
 
12
 Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam pact of 1957 considered use of Tamil language in the country. 
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The Thimpu talks in 1985 opened the venues to begin negotiations between the GoSL 
and Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF) with the help of India. For the first time 
there was with direct assistance of a third party. According to the government point of 
view the Thimpu talks would have become progressive if Tamil military groups had 
surrendered by laying down their arms and dismantling their training camps (Uyangoda 
2005:310). Some criticisms point to the rigid and inflexible attitude adopted by the Sri 
Lanka government delegation. They allowed the ENLF to withdraw from the peace talks 
and caused armed confrontation in the period after (Balasingham 2004:79).  
J.R. Jayawardane who was the president (1978-1989) took a regional approach to bring 
about a political settlement to the ethnic problem by inviting Indian Prime Minister to 
cooperate into an inter-state agreement. Scholarly arguments note, Indian involvement is 
a Peace Trap, placed Sri Lanka in turmoil that Sri Lanka had to largely depend on Indian 
geo-political strategic interests by turning nation problem- regionalized. 
President Ranasinghe Premadasa (1989-1993) did not allow any outside mediation and 
treated the ethnic problem as a purely internal matter. Thus, there were always risks of 
peace talks being unilaterally terminated due to lack of accountability between parties 
(Uyangoda 2005:321). Thereafter, Chandrika Kumaratunga Bandaranaike came into 
presidency (1994-2005) with a promise of finding a peaceful solution to the ethnic 
problem. She initiated direct peace talks with LTTE with the help of the Norway 
facilitation. This ended a bloody civil war which caused around 68,000 war related 
deaths. 
Ironically, the Ceasefire Agreement in 2002 which was considered a foremost 
achievement of the GoSL and the LTTE is abrogated at the present. The Geneva talks 
held in two sessions in 2006 under Mahinda Rajapaksha’s presidency (2005 to date), 
resulted with no prospects in the peace process. A little hope emerged when Sri Lanka’s 
All Party Representative Committee (APRC) drafted proposals with power sharing 
mechanisms. They have not yet even consolidated as of November 2007.        
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1.5 Research Question  
It is important to examine whether Norway can provide an effective and a positive role in 
Sri Lanka’s protracted military conflict. The existing literature shows Norway’s 
facilitation adopting different outlooks. For example, some consider Norway’s 
facilitation as an active role, while others determine it to be passive. Yet, some analysts 
think mediation should be a middle-way process. However, for a balanced analysis one 
must look at the mediator’s strategies, the conflict’s nature and conflicting parties’ 
behavioral attributes. All of this must be calculated to determine facilitator’s overall 
actions. In negotiation literature, mediation finds its way as a two-way process 
(Bercovitch & Houston 1995:20-31; Pruitt 1997:245-247; Beardsley et.al. 2006:62-66; 
Schneider et.al. 2006:2-3). Gerald Schneider and his colleagues (Schneider et.al. 2006:2) 
argue that the combatants should first decide whether or not they would like to end the 
conflict through mediation. On the other hand, the mediator’s choice over eventual 
attempts to end the conflict is essential in deciding mediator’s role. 
Norway facilitates the peace process in a multi faceted manner. The direct and personal 
level of political involvement is most important, which includes Track I diplomacy. This 
is a combination of mere facilitation through communication strategies. In addition, 
Norway helps through humanitarian and development work, which is Track II diplomacy.  
As mentioned above, Norway’s role can be viewed in different perspectives. The basic 
political facilitation of Norwegians includes information sharing, exchanging views and 
interests between parties, confidence building etc. Thus inevitably, a personal 
involvement is important to the process of mediation and it is important to examine the 
role that the mediator plays in Sri Lanka’s conflict.  
A facilitator, in general has a large responsibility to formulate constructive ideas to make 
negotiations effective at the pre-negotiation stage, which is known as a period of “talks 
about talks”. Gathering a proper understanding of the disputants problem is always a 
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challenge for an external third party at this stage. A careful observation of causes within 
the conflict through expertise knowledge while maintaining a good relationship with the 
parties will let the third party overcome this challenge.  
During the negotiation process the dyadic-hostile relationship between the disputants will 
turn into a triadic-cooperative relationship. The triangular relationship is often monitored 
by the facilitator. The facilitator systematically develops trust and faith between the 
parties using the triangular relationship. Information and views shared between the 
parties is the main tool for achieving trust. It is essential that facilitator remains neutral 
(impartial) through this process.   
Like in many other international peace making efforts, Norway plays a less forceful role 
in the facilitation of Sri Lanka’s peace process. Norway’s facilitation does not exploit 
leverage in terms of political and military means. Instead, Norway seeks venues for 
financial and humanitarian assistance, which aim at development work. Norwegian 
foreign policy on several occasions mentioned that they have no interest in the use of 
force or power in internal decision making of those mediated conflicts. Norway Foreign 
Ministry official has recently acknowledged, “Norway can use carrots to encourage 
parties for cooperation and convince parties to stop violence so that they will be better- 
off in terms of aid and development assistance (MFA 2007[interview])”. Therefore, in 
most respects, the use of force has been less significant in their foreign involvements.  
Norway insists the questioning of humanitarian crisis which devastate the countries. 
Norway acknowledges the importance of the absence of military confrontation, which 
subsequently helps to establish a suitable environment for relief and development work. 
The question is how far an external facilitator can exist in development work in a 
militarized conflict. Can a facilitator convince parties to stop the arms struggle? And can 
parties, at the same time agree to end the arms struggle?  
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Another aspect of looking at this question is the facilitator’s alternative choice if 
negotiations fail. Can the facilitator bring a compromise for the disputants through a 
broader coalition, which is accepted by both parties? Sometimes, a facilitator seeks 
different initiatives to maintain negotiations, such as formulation and manipulation. A 
facilitator might get into a deeper involvement through problem solving and might use 
forceful mechanisms in order to retain conflicting parties on the negotiation table. 
However, those necessary tools and strategic decisions of formulation and manipulation 
can surpass the traditional framework of facilitation by creating a dilemma in facilitation. 
Research questions: 
I) To what extent has Norway been effective in facilitating the peace process in Sri 
Lanka?  
II) How can we explain the facilitator’s successes and failures? 
The initial facilitation is essential to bring the parties together into a common bargaining 
space. As a result, the facilitation will become the most desirable role in mediation at the 
diagnosis phase.13 It should be noted that disputants should be ready to perceive each 
other as partners in the peace attempt and willing to build confidence with each other. 
This is while the facilitator helps to share messages and exchange necessary information 
to support the parties through building trust. Norway’s facilitation played an eminent role 
convincing parties for peace through “shuttle diplomacy (Stangeland 2007[interview])”. 
Nevertheless, re-starting proper peace talks has been a difficult task for Norway since the 
collapse of peace talks in March 2003. Therefore, it is important to look at the following 
assumption: 
                                                 
13
 William Zartman & Maureen Berman explain about three stages of negotiation processes. The first stage called 
‘Diagnosis Phase’ is the turning point for negotiations, when conflicting parties recognize a solution to the conflict 
is possible. Hence, ready take initial steps to peace talks (Habeeb 1988:29).  
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A1:   Facilitation in an intrastate conflict is likely to be successful upon the facilitator’s 
ability to remove or reduce power imbalances of disputants. 
It is argued that each mediation style that includes facilitation should help to contribute to 
reduce tension (Beardsley et.al. 2006:68). To reduce tension between parties in particular 
is known as ‘crisis abatement’. Sri Lanka’s conflict has been militarized over the two 
decades and as a result, unlike other secessionist groups in the world, the LTTE is now 
equipped with ground and limited naval and air force power. The conflict paved way for 
the 4,126 war related deaths in 2006.14 
It is difficult to resolve hostility in a short time due to a deep imbalance of power 
between disputants. Thus, facilitation needs deeper and more long term commitment to 
succeed in tension reduction. There had been a considerable reduction of war related 
violence at the early stage of the Ceasefire Agreement. Nevertheless, violence has begun 
to increase gradually within the last three years. The following assumption is useful to 
analyze Norway’s role in tension reduction. 
A2:    Facilitation in an intrastate conflict is likely to be successful upon facilitator’s 
strategic choice for tension reduction. 
Some argue that the mediator’s impartiality is not important in finding a settlement to the 
conflict, where as the mediator’s leverage and use of resources are what matters in 
pursuing disputants to an optimal solution (Schneider 2006:11). However, the neutral 
image of a facilitator is important to maintain a productive role. My third assumption 
which is fairly different from the first two delineates the idea that the facilitator’s 
impartiality plays a role in image building. The following will investigate Norway’s in-
depth behavior.  
                                                 
14
 According to the World Watch Institute, feature about “The Casualties of Sri Lanka Intensifying War” 2006 
reported the highest number of war related deaths. According to the figures by June 2007 the number of war related 
deaths has become 1,658. For more details, URL:  http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5184 .    
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A3:    Facilitation in an intrastate conflict is likely to be successful upon the facilitator’s 
impartiality towards conflicting parties.  
 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis  
The thesis consists of five chapters. The second chapter explains the theoretical 
background of the topic. Since there is no major theory on “facilitation” the study 
examines important literatures on mediation in negotiation processes. In fact, the study 
deals with strategies of facilitation in particular. The theory of power and norms is used 
to develop an idea about structure and attributes of conflicting parties. Once the meaning 
of facilitation and the parties’ structures are identified, the study looks at the following 
three variables: (1) The parties’ power imbalance (2) The choice of tension reduction (3) 
The facilitator’s impartiality. These variables are examined to see how they affect the 
facilitator’s overall behavior. The third chapter will explain the methodology that was 
used in writing the thesis. The fourth chapter is the main analysis, which looks at the 
facts and information for the basis of the assumptions. The detail discussion provides a 
comprehensive knowledge about the actual role of Norway’s facilitation in the Sri 
Lankan peace process for the past six years. The last chapter, which is the summery and 
the conclusion, discusses the findings.  
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Chapter 2 
THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether Norway’s role as a facilitator was 
effective in peace negotiations in Sri Lanka. It is assumed that effectiveness of facilitation 
remains in the mediator’s ability to remove or reduce power imbalances within the 
conflicting parties, to reduce tension and act on a neutral basis.15 The assumptions cover a 
broad perception of mediation. These assumptions are interrelated to each other and have 
a mutual affect on one-another. The “Contingency Model” which is utilized by Jacob 
Bercovitch, a professor and a veteran in conflict studies, provides a broad picture of how 
mediation is effective in actual complex settings.  Further, Jacob Bercovitch and Allison 
Houston discuss the factors that effect successful mediation.  This chapter will attempt to 
explain some coherent conceptual and theoretical aspects of Jacob Bercovitich and 
Allison Houston, and explain how those variables matters for effective mediation.  
 
 
2.2 Contingency Model 
 
Scholarly writings that explains mediation in general and facilitation in particular are rare 
in existing literature of conflict studies.  Thus ‘facilitation’ becomes a secondary area of 
study.  As a result the phenomenon has become less popular in common understandings.  
The “Contingency Model” developed by Jacob Bercovitch (1995) tries to illuminate 
comprehensively the role of mediation by taking a number of variables into account.  The 
core of this approach is explained and elucidated by operating three variables: context, 
                                                 
15
 The basic assumptions are discussed in Chapter One (18-22) 
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process, and outcome. This provides a broader understanding of the nature and strategies 
of mediation as a whole.  
 
The Model considers contextual and procedural variables vital in deciding the outcome of 
mediation in both a subjective and objective manner. We also see that, “mediation 
outcomes, whether successful or not, are logically seen as the result of the interaction of 
context and process variables (Bercovitich & Houston 1995:15)”. The context that deals 
with the nature of the mediator, the conflicting parties, and the nature of the dispute, is 
closely related to the process that deals with initiation and conduct of mediation.  
Therefore, in order to obtain a certain result, the context factor influencing the process of 
mediation is best understood in a single framework like that of the ‘Contingency Model’. 
The framework outlined in the following figure shows how ‘Contingency Model’ 
assembles strategies and processes of mediation. It enables to understand the factors 
depict the relationship among conditions antecedent to mediation, the actual process of 
mediation and the consequent result.   
 
Figure 1    A Contingency Model of Mediation   
 
   Antecedent Conditions                Current Conditions        Consequent Conditions 
 
 
Context                  Process   Outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bercovitch, Jacob & Allison Houston (1995) “The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical 
  Issues and Empirical Evidence” in Jacob Bercovitich (ed.) Resolving International Conflicts, U.S.A:  
  Lynne Rienner Publishers, 15. 
 
 
Nature of Parties 
Nature of Dispute 
Nature of Mediator 
Initiation of Mediation 
Mediation Environment 
Strategies of Mediation 
Subjective/ Objective 
Determine the Success 
and/or Failure of Mediation 
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2.3 Factors Effecting Mediation 
 
The detailed analysis of international mediation, provided by Bercovitch and Houston, 
(1995) distinguishes three variables that examine mediation success and effectiveness 
broadly.  It is worthwhile to explain these variables in-depth. 
 
The contextual variables: identified as ‘antecedent conditions’ (i) nature of the party (ii) 
nature of the dispute and (iii) nature of the mediator vital in analyzing the effect of the 
mediator’s role.  Even though some of these factors are not directly related to the 
mediator’s attributes it is very likely that these can effect mediation success and 
effectiveness.  
 
 
I) Nature of the Party 
 
The civil wars, in general that are fought between imbalanced powers more often cause 
complexities in negotiations. The expensive concession of each comes to an end and the 
lack of willingness of the parties for accommodating eachothers is some common 
examples of complexities. On that basis, there is a greater ability for symmetrical powers 
to pursue cooperation in an effective manner than asymmetrical powers. The GoSL and 
the LTTE in Sri Lanka are a significant example of an asymmetrical situation.  
 
Another predicament is the composition of the population. When a diverse ethnic and 
cultural setting exists in a conflict, the mediator may find it complicating to deal with 
each and every community on an equal basis.  Consequently, some groups of people that 
belong to certain ethnic or cultural communities do not have access to participate in 
negotiation processes and this may emanate as a spoiler factor in ongoing negotiations.  
In Sri Lanka, the Muslims and other Tamil organizations protested that they had been 
excluded in the negations.  
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Raymond and Kegley say, “The greater the cultural differences between disputants, the 
less likelihood of successful mediation (Bercovitich 1995:21)”. Marieke Kleiboer 
(1996:365) came up with a similar notion explaining that, “mediation can only be 
successful, if the parties in conflict are clearly identifiable in terms of group 
characteristics and boundaries, yet, in actual conflict, often problematic to cooperate with 
all the identities”.  Evidently, in most civil wars, mediation results in failure due to the 
complex nature of parties affiliated to the conflict.  Barbara Walter in her book 
Committing to Peace (2002:12) explains that, “civil wars between different ethnic groups 
are frequently depicted as intensive value conflicts fought over issues close to the heart”.   
She further says those civil wars are less likely to end in a negotiated settlement in 
conflicts of heterogeneous identity (Walter 2002:15).16   
 
The proposition of Walter’s (2002) cited above, in my opinion, applies in Sri Lanka 
peace process. Much debated, civil war in its conceptual inappropriateness-later became 
to known as ethnic-conflict (Uyangoda 2006:9) armed-conflict (Ramasamy 2006:174).  
Unfortunately, Sri Lanka has failed to find a negotiated solution to the ongoing problem 
so far.  The reasons for such shortcomings are several.  One of the foremost notions is 
that the political level solution should be concerned with finding a shared political future 
for all the citizens of Sri Lanka (Uyangoda 2006:9).  
 
 
II) Nature of the Dispute 
 
The existing literature shows the intensity of the conflict encourages mediation.  
Sustaining the proposition, Zartman and Touval (1996) say, “Mediation is much more 
likely to occur during intense international events, such as crises”.  Jackson and Young 
suggest, the greater the intensity of the dispute, the higher the likelihood that mediation 
                                                 
16
 Barbara Walter refers ethnic divergence of former Yugoslavia in order to sum up her idea about how negotiations 
fail in heterogeneous communities (Walter 2002).    
 26 
will be accepted and be successful (Bercovitch & Houston 1995:23).  If mediation means 
moving parties towards an agreement and cessation of violence, then the mediator’s main 
task should be convincing parties for a change in their previous power position(s) and 
compensate with alternative methods to ‘win’ each party’s goals at a minimum cost for 
the other. 
 
It is considered that mediation requires firm exertion, generally, at long-term conflicts 
due to the conflicting parties’ unwillingness to change their rigid power positions.  Those 
power positions, more often militarily and politically hostile can bring a tremendous 
destruction to conflicting parties. According to William Zartman, the moment that parties 
understand the painfulness of each others military stand known as “mutually hurting 
stalemate”, results in a painful ‘deadlock’ that, parties should seek for an alternative way 
of winning the goals (Zartman & Rubin 2000:272; Hopmann 1996:76-80).  It is important 
to note that mediation is encouraged at a time when parties are ready to reverse armed 
confrontation and ready for a negotiated solution.   
 
Interestingly, the mediation becomes more effective in the absence of violence.  The 
lower the intensity of the conflicting parties, the greater the ability of parties to agree on 
compatible goals which results in mutual non-violence and promotes cooperation.  Even 
if one considers that mediation becomes effective in high-intensity conflicts, the chance 
for a mediator to remain in the process is less likely if the intensity remains throughout 
the cause of negotiations.  In many ethnic conflicts and civil wars mediation fails due to 
its inability to reduce the violence.  According to Gerald Schneider and his colleagues 
(2006:14), “intensity stands for the average fierceness of combat, which calculate the 
natural logarithm of the number of casualties divided by the number of months that 
conflict has lasted until the mediation attempt occurs and similarly the course of time 
mediation exits”.  So, if the number of casualties increases while mediation takes place, 
there will be a decrease of effectiveness of mediation. Obviously, then the intensity of the 
conflict fails the expected outcome of a successful mediation.  
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Another factor to be considered in determining the mediator’s effectiveness are the 
‘issues’ within the conflict. The issues are more basic in underlying the causes of the 
dispute (Bercovitch 1995:24). Edward Azar analyzed phenomenon, “Protracted Social 
Conflict”. According to Azar, the prolonged and often violent struggles by communal 
groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance (Ramsbotham 
2005:13-114). Such conflicts, according to Azar do not show clear starting and 
termination points (ibid.).  Bercovitch and Houston (1995:24) identify five categories to 
describe types of issues that may characterize conflicts: sovereignty, ideology, security, 
independence, and issues including ethnicity. Christopher Moore, a veteran in conflict 
studies, explains how a mediator deals in conflicts within the complexity and ambiguity 
of their issues. According to Moore, conflicts are either ‘interest-based’ or ‘value-based’. 
The value-based conflicts are less amenable to compromise and integration and so 
mediators should avoid describing disputes in terms of value differences when and where 
possible.  The activity of defining the issues is called framing or reframing.  Mediators 
help the parties to frame the issues in ways that will enable effective problem-solving. 
Value-based disputes can be reframed either by reinterpreting the issues as interests, 
avoiding the value elements, or by appealing to broader shared values. Interest-based 
disputes can be reframed by either broadening or focusing the issues (Glaser [online]).  
 
However, by solving the issues the mediator seeks to remove the power discrepancies of 
the parties.  In order to do so, the mediator’s ability to redefine, add and subtract issues to 
find a common bargaining space is important (Carnevale 1986:55; Sebenius 2002:155-
156).    
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III) Nature of the Mediator 
 
According to Bercovitch and Houston (1995:25), the mediator’s identity and 
characteristics largely influence the effectiveness of the mediation. Personal attributes 
including, prestige, rank and the knowledge of the mediator become relevant and 
important when it is combined with whole process of negotiation. However, the mediator 
has a choice to select strategic tools in order to find a settlement to the conflict. It is a 
question whether mediator’s choice become acceptable to the warring parties.  
 
What are mediator’s choices? Christopher Moore talks about two types of tools. One tool 
is general tactics- different kinds of interventions that mediators use in almost all 
conflicts. The interventions include tactics for entering the dispute, analyzing the conflict, 
planning the mediation, identifying parties' interests, facilitating parties' negotiations and 
helping them generate proposals, drafting agreements and developing implementation 
plans. The other tool is contingent tactics- these tactics are used to handle special 
problems which can arise during negotiations.  Contingent tactics may be used to address 
such problems as value clashes, power imbalances, destructive patterns of interaction, 
communication problems, strong emotions, misinformation, and differing analyses 
(Glaser [online]). 
In addition, the mediator’s identity as having an impartial role is crucial in negotiations. 
This evokes intense debate in scholarly studies. These debates are rather critical and 
analyze in-depth the cognitive attributes of the mediator.  Mediator’s impartiality 
becomes crucial in the task of confidence-building (Kleiboer 1996:369). Conversely, 
some believe mediators are accepted by the adversaries not because of their impartiality 
but because of their ability to influence, protect or extend the interest of each party in 
conflict (Bercovitch 1995:26).  Given similar considerations by Bercovitch and Schneider 
(2006), the mediator’s power and leverage is important for effective mediation.          
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The procedural variable is important for completing the knowledge of the overall 
behavior of the mediator. It includes in ‘current condition’ (i.e. figure 2.1) in the 
contingency approach. There are three such levels of processes, (i) The process of 
initiation of mediation (ii) Mediation environment and (iii) Strategies of mediation. 
 
I) Initiation of Mediation 
The stage of initiating mediation is important as it is the time of opening negotiations.  
Paul Pillar, who comprehensively studies about negotiation processes, says that the 
opening of peace talks is a change in the state of war (Pillar 1983:44). The opening of 
negotiations is a matter of how the parties depend on prospects of future military success 
and failure (Pillar 1983:49). Thus, the initial strategies of mediation become central in 
determining how long and how productive the peace talks will continue to be. In addition, 
the mediation becomes effective when both the parties agree a common mediator. Added 
to that Bercovitch and Houston (1995:28) say, “mediation is most likely to be successful 
when initiated by both parties in a dispute”. Alternatively, a mediator can be appointed by 
an authoritative actor as well (Glaser [online]).  In most cases, influence by a regional 
power or any other powerful state, which has a connection to the conflicting party (ies) 
and/or an international organization, can be examples in this matter.  For example, In Sri 
Lanka Norway had to brief the peace initiatives to India.  
 
II) Mediation Environment 
This delineates the idea that a mediator needs freedom: a space to implement their 
strategies and tools without influence of the other(s) to best endeavor in accurate 
cooperation between parties.  The idea put forward by many scholars suggests that it is an 
essential factor for successful mediation (Bercovitch 1995; Kleiboer 1996; Beardsley 
 30 
et.al.2006). Bercovitch and Huston (1995:29) admit, “An environment allows the 
mediator to have procedural control over the process and the parties to concentrate on the 
more substantive issues”. Yet, in practice mediators get influenced by powerful regional 
actors or by international actors. Occasionally, mediation becomes flexible according to 
conflicting parties wishes or purely the mediator’s interests. This notion can be well 
understood by looking at the different strategies of mediation, which is discussed in the 
following.      
 
III) Strategies of Mediation 
Mediation strategies and tools are varied in each and every process of negotiation.  It is a 
continuum ranging from low to high intervention (Bercovitch & Houston 1995:29; 
Zartman & Touval 1996; Beardsley et.al 2006; Schneider et.al 2006). Among the 
substantive strategies that encompass a wide spectrum of mediation behavior: facilitation, 
formulation and Manipulation stand vital.  
 
A mediator as a facilitator is the least forceful among all the strategies, which constitutes 
merely a role of a communicator.  This role holds the main task of communication 
between parties.17  
 
A mediator as a formulator holds formal control over some of the procedural strategies 
and known as an identical tool in effective bargaining and coordination in most 
negotiations (Carnevale 1986:59-64; Beardsley et.al 2006:63).  Through out the 
bargaining process a formulator would seek, “to modify the parties’ image, which 
influences them to make concessions by clarifying to each his opponent’s views and the 
bargaining situation that both face (Hopmann 1996:234)”.  In fact, Beardsley and his 
                                                 
17
 Refer Chapter One (10-11) 
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colleagues (2006:63) find out, “unlike facilitation, formulation involves a substantive 
contribution to negotiations”. These substantive suggestions concern preparing agendas 
including certain procedures18 of how structured negotiations are concern in formulation.   
 
 A mediator as a manipulator is the strongest type of mediation, in terms of decision-
making and use of leverage at negotiations.  According to Bercovitch (1995:26), 
mediation becomes effective to the degree of influence that will make parties’ change 
their rigid positions towards a mutual goal.  In general, either through punishments for 
hostile behaviors (use of sticks) or rewards (use of carrots) for cooperative moves, 
increase incentives of conflicting parties’ towards a compromise. The ability to make 
rewards and/or punishments based on the third party’s power on available resources. 
Hence, it may be easier for a powerful third party to introduce concessions to compensate 
the party that makes concessions, with rewards and compel threats or punishments to the 
party that exploits concessions by wrong-doing.  Interestingly enough, conflicting parties 
may also prefer to make concessions through a mediator, which is assumed as a tactical 
approach to protect their reputation and future bargaining positions (Hopmann 1996:223).  
 
The ‘Contingency Model’ (i.e. figure 2.1) explains the antecedent and current conditions 
leading for successful mediation. It deals with the context and process variables in detail. 
These variables in the ‘Contingency Model’ are useful to determine Norway’s role of 
facilitation broadly. The following diagram clarifies the overall design of my study. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Procedural Tactics are task of structuring negotiations, attention to important issues and influence for possible 
agreements. It can convince each party when faces temporal constrain that necessitates immediate progress 
(Beardsley et.al 2006:64). 
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  Figure 2    Research Design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explanatory Variable; Norway’s Role of Facilitation 
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Out come; Norway role to be effective or not? 
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Chapter 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will explain the main research design and the methodological framework of 
the thesis in a broad perspective. This study in particular is designed to be a ‘single case 
study’. The main approach for gathering information and facts was based on qualitative 
methods, a combination of three sources: literature reviews, interviews and archival 
research. 
 
 
3.2 Case Study 
 
A ‘single case study’ is often used to gain comprehensive knowledge about the behavior 
of a single phenomenon in a complex setting.  The use of this case study enables me to 
gather coherent and detailed information about Norway’s role from 2002 until the end of 
2006.  The time period of the study was decided on the basis of some landmark events 
within Norway’s involvement in Sri Lanka’s peace talks.  
 
A well-defined area of study is identified as a core characteristic of the empirical studies 
in scientific research.  In other words, by defining an exact ‘boundary’ within the case it 
essentially guides the researcher on what to study and how to study the research. Sharan 
Merriam (1998) argues that “the single most defining characteristic of case study research 
lies in delimiting the object of study the case, which is a thing, a single entity, a unit 
around which there are boundaries”. This setting creates an optimum background for 
empirical observations and a profitable environment for inquiries.  
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In scientific research the importance of the ‘specificity of focus’ is identified as a core, 
and vital characteristic (Merriam 1998; Yin 2004). It is considered as the basic design for 
practical problems: questions, situations, or puzzling occurrences arising from everyday 
practice (Merriam 1998). The ‘criterion variables’ (i.e. figure 2.2) try to capture a broad 
view of Norway’s actual role in Sri Lanka.   
 
 
3.3 Use of Sources 
 
Yin (1994) describes the case study as a comprehensive research strategy different than a 
particular methodology for data collection. The qualitative research methodology, 
considered as the main approach in my study brings various explanations, ideas and 
views into a single text. The numerical data presentations are also utilized in order to 
describe some vital explanations in the study. 
 
 
3.3.1 Literature Survey 
 
The literature survey among both primary and secondary sources is the foremost method 
of data collecting. My main sources were books, journal articles, newspaper articles, 
reviews, presentations and online journals.  
 
The aim of the literature survey is to fulfill the knowledge about a certain phenomenon 
that has been studied over a time especially, when the time and capacity is limited for the 
researcher in the field work. In fact, the advantage of literature surveys is that they enable 
the researcher to maintain the line of the argument both in-depth and broadly. Herbert 
Hyman argues, “Survey research provides one of the rare avenues for the empirical 
description of long-term changes and for examining the way phenomenon vary under the 
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contrasted conditions operative in one or several society(ies)  at several points (Nachmias 
& Nachmias 2005:306)”.  
 
 However, there are arguments about the replication of secondary sources which deal 
with their reliability and accuracy. Theses arguments subside the notion of secondary 
data as the ‘best approach’ for information. Critics show how some personal and 
emotional insights of writers can influence exaggerations and understatements. Thus, the 
reliability of secondary sources remains debated.  
 
Interestingly, there are few reasons to choose the literature survey as the foremost source.  
A study about a politically sensitive and contemporary active topic like the ‘Role of 
Norway’s facilitation’ in my opinion requires a gradual and careful observation on 
empirical data. It is apparent that a large number of articles found available to the public 
assess the peace process in different dimensions. These articles and/or papers do not deal 
with the whole process of negotiations in a single document and essentially do not 
explain all the dimensions in a single context. However, there are only handful of papers 
published on ‘Norway’s role within the facilitation of the Sri Lankan peace process’ that 
focused both on Norway’s perspective and the stakeholders perspectives. Yet, these 
papers seldom covered the whole period of facilitation nearly six years from 2002 until 
early 2008.19 Therefore, I believe, the venues for new establishments are open for further 
studies and the best approach for such a study can be a combination of both primary and 
secondary sources.  
 
The following articles remain momentous among the number of articles which I referred 
in the study. Such as N. Shanmugaratnam and K. Stokke’s, “Development as a Precursor 
to Conflict Resolution: A Critical Review of the Fifth Peace Process in Sri Lanka (2004), 
John Stephen Moolakkattu’s, “Peace Facilitation by Small States; Norway in Sri Lanka 
                                                 
19
 Norway involved in dealing with the GoSL and the LTTE in year 2000, when President Kumaratunga and the 
LTTE leader invited them as a third-party negotiator. Norway became active as the official level facilitator after 
signing the CFA in February, 2002.   
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(2005)”, Kristine Hoglund’s, “Violence and the Peace Process in Sri Lanka (2005)”, Ann 
Kelleher & James Larry Toulbee’s, “Bridging the Gap; Building Peace Norwegian Style 
(2006)” stand vital. There are also some interesting reports: Hilde Henriksen Waage’s, 
“Norwegians? Who needs Norwegians? (2000)” and Vidar Helgesen’s, presentation on 
“Peace, Mediation and Reconciliation; the Norwegian Experience (2003)”.  
 
In addition, there are two books which I used often in gaining first-person’s opinion on 
the GoSL and the LTTE sides. One book was “Negotiating with the Tigers (LTTE) 
(2002-2005) A View from the Second Raw” by John Gooneratne.20 Jayantha Dhanapala 
who served as the Secretary- General at SCOPP regarded Gooneratne’s book as, “An 
objective analysis and a guide to future negotiations (Dhanapala 2007[online])”. The 
other book was “War and Peace- Armed Struggle and Peace Efforts of Liberation Tigers” 
by the late Anton Balasingham who was the theoretician and the political advisor of the 
LTTE.  He worked as the chief negotiator of the LTTE, through out the Norway-
facilitated peace process in Sri Lanka, from 2002 until 2006.  His point of view about the 
peace process in general and about Norway’s role in particular, provides some interesting 
thoughts about the LTTE point of view. In my opinion, Balasingham’s book is useful at 
three levels.  First, the facts he analyzed are eye-witnessed and self-experienced. Second, 
the book explicated the LTTE point of view about the peace process. Finally, the 
information found in the book compensated for information that I could have gained from 
a face-to-face interview with a LTTE respondent21 that did not happen in the interviews. 
Apart from secondary sources, there is some raw data and statistics used for explaining 
war related deaths, cease-fire violations, internally-displaced people (IDPs) and the 
Donor contributions. 
 
                                                 
20
  John Gooneratne was a key informant and an interviewee in my research. He is a renowned carrier diplomat and 
the former Deputy Secretary-General in Sri Lanka’s Peace Secretariat (known as Sri Lanka’s Government 
Secretariat for co-ordinating the Peace Process-SCOPP) 
 
21
 I was unable to communicate directly to any LTTE political personals. The time I stayed in Sri Lanka for the field 
research from June- August 2007 was not a safe time to travel to North due to open military confrontations.  
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3.3.2 Interviews 
 
The next key approach for collecting data was interviews. These were mainly face-to face 
interviews. The informants were identified prior to the formal meeting on the basis of the 
respondents’ affiliation to the area of study.  It is important to note the accessibility, time, 
and scope of the research has been considered as important factors in selecting these 
respondents.   
 
The so-called ‘Elite Survey’ approach benefited me in several ways. It helped to gather 
personal experiences and information that I may not find in the written documents. The 
respondents close affiliation to the subject and their experiences helped tremendously to 
affirm enough information. These surveys were organized in advance before the formal 
meetings with the acknowledgment of the set of questions22 regarding the study. The 
early preparations and inclinations benefited as it was effective to gain vital information 
that was coherent to my research.       
 
There were two aspects that made the interviewing very important. One was the 
respondents close association to the problem. This enabled me to access important facts 
about their individual behavior and role of decision-making at the actual process of 
negotiations. In fact, the respondents, who were familiar with the area, often came up 
with direct and recent information. The other aspect was being able to understand their 
personal level of knowledge within the role of ‘facilitation’, both at an academic and 
practical level. These information gathered from interviews helped to develop my 
arguments more logically and realistically.  
.     
                                                 
22
 The three sets of questionnaires are attached in the appendix. 
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The key interviewees23: Jon Hannsen Bauer, the Norwegian Special Envoy for the Peace 
Process in Sri Lanka (2006-2008), Hans Brattskar, the former Ambassador to Sri Lanka 
(2003-2007), Geir Sjoberg, the Political Advisor to Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission 
(SLMM), Tomas Stangeland, the Advisor to Section for Peace and Reconciliation; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Norway and John Gooneratne the Former Deputy 
Secretary- General in SCOPP in Sri Lanka (2002-2006), were the key respondents. Their 
remarkable support and cordial conversations made my task easy and productive. The 
respondents were interviewed through questionnaires except from John Gooneratne who 
interviewed in an informal setting.  
 
In addition, some other informal discussions that were held several occasions in 
Norway’s capital and in Colombo, Sri Lanka’s capital, stand as most essential. They 
allowed me to acquire valuable thoughts and facts.24 The discussions mostly carried in an 
informal atmosphere. I talked with some staff members and journalists work for Sri 
Lankan newspapers. This helped to update my knowledge about latest war and peace 
events. In addition, the conversations with some staff members of University of Oslo, 
who are familiar with the peace process helped me to broaden my knowledge about the 
Norwegian aspects about the Sri Lankan peace process. Sinhala-Tamil Diaspora in Oslo, 
which I considered as another important element, and even a relatively small number of 
Sri Lankan Muslims who are currently living in Oslo, were among some people that I 
exchanged views about the study. These conversations brought different personal 
perspectives that were useful in broadening my understanding of some the thoughts.    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 I uphold the information about the respondents: their names, professions, time and place of interviews and details 
of the conversation.  
 
24
 I withhold the names of the respondents.  
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3.3.3 Archival Research 
 
The historical texts used brought together the historical background of the conflict and 
the peace process. I mostly looked at the post-colonial history of Sri Lanka.25 These texts 
were useful in scrutinizing facts in different dimensions. 
   
However, the task of selecting a profound historical text was a challenge. A careful 
observation of historical facts of the Sri Lankan conflict showed that there was no single 
perspective of the cause(s) of the current conflict. Some texts were motivated by author’s 
personal interests. In my opinion romanticization of historical episodes and 
misinterpretation of events were more often the reason for losing the actual value of the 
texts.  This coincidental experience can sometimes be a common problem to any 
researcher which choosy on historical texts. Shantha Hennayake’s review of two 
historical books about Sri Lanka’s politics26 explains that, “recent Sri Lankan political 
historiography has been dominated by nationalist writings… (Hennayake 1991:440 
[online])”.  
 
It is argued that the past that a historian studies is not a dead past, but a past which in 
some sense is still living in the present (Carr 1961). Hence, the likelihood that historical 
texts can become influenced by people’s interests and values is inevitable. To overcome 
this challenge, I have been looking at several books concerning the ethnic-cultural 
background of authors. This allowed me to look at materials produced with different 
mind-settings in different cultural affiliations that helped me to avoid me from unwanted 
and biased writings.  
 
 
                                                 
25
 Sri Lanka became independent form Britain in 1948. It is argued that the constitutional and social, economic and 
political changes thereafter were short-term and direct causes of the current ethnic problem.  
 
26
 Shantha Hennayake (1991:440-442[online]) has reviewed “Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka” by 
Chelvadurai Manogaran and “The Expedient Utopian: Bandaranaike and Ceylon” by James Manor. 
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3.4 Issues and Limitations 
 
There were two types of issues that came along during the study. First, the issue of 
instrumental-operationalism that leads to generalizations. This is more a technical 
difficulty, rather than a constrain in the field work. In general, instrumental-
operationalism deals with thoughtful verification and creditability. The question is: Can I 
make generalizations from a single case study? The other constraint, deals with personal 
interests and feelings. It is an ethical issue rather driven by my conscience for a 
‘balanced’ examination.   
 
First, I will mention how I managed to overcome the issue of instrumental-
operationalism. According to scientific research, “Case studies provide little for scientific 
generalization (Yin 1994:10)”. In such instance, the question is how far a single case 
study is acceptable for generalized conclusions, when a single case study is more specific 
and limited than a comparative case study. It is argued that a single case study does 
provide adequate operationalism: the variables are logically sound, inclusion of relevant 
components, sufficient data, and transparent procedural measures. All of this allows 
allowing others to use and repeat the same conclusion which guarantees reliability and 
validity.  
 
Notably, the main question of my study explains a single phenomenon in a single context. 
This phenomenon is, ‘The role of Norway’s facilitation’ within the context of the Sri 
Lankan peace process. The same process and context does not apply in another context. 
Therefore, these generalizations apply for the Case in Sri only. This study provides a 
deep insight into the overall process of Norway’s facilitation and how effective they were 
in negotiations.  
 
Second, the ethical issue is the constraint of being a Sri Lankan. The fact that I was born 
and have grown-up as a Sinhala, Buddhist in Sri Lanka perhaps could have an impact on 
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my explanations. Strictly speaking, there has been several times that I re-wrote some 
parts of my texts to avoid unnecessary biased explanations.   
 
Since I did not experience or suffer from any direct military conflict from either the 
GoSL or the LTTE, kept me from explaining about the extreme wild side of war. If I had 
this experience which could have been an important aspect of the conflict according to 
some other’s point of view. The ground reality of war and its negative consequences, 
political chaos, economic breakdowns and especially psychological impact are some 
factors that overwhelmingly touch my thoughts and emotions. In my study, I tried to be 
objective as much as possible to avoid emotional explanations. My goal was to have an 
analytical and factually balanced study. 
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Chapter 4 
NORWAY’S FACILITATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS 
 
4.1 Introduction      
 
This chapter critically looks at the deep problem of unachieved peace in Sri Lanka. In this 
connection I examined the role of Norway as the facilitator during several phases of 
peace negotiations. In the first part of the chapter I traced the recent events and the 
situations of the GoSL and the LTTE which stimulated parties to cooperate. The second 
part of the discussion broadly constructs the idea of Norway’s political and economic 
involvement in Sri Lanka. The third part assesses Norway’s accomplishments in 
peacemaking. This provides a lengthy discussion about the main assumptions27 of the 
study. The last part of the chapter discusses the drawbacks of Norway’s role for almost 
six years of peace facilitation in Sri Lanka. 
 
 
4.2 The Parties’ Engagement  
 
The changing nature of the main stakeholders’ interests in peace to end the militaristic 
endeavors is a crucial factor in the difficult passage of peace-making processes in Sri 
Lanka. The dynamics of state politics, economic stability, public opinion and 
international influence have been influential factors in deciding what sort of state 
approach is suitable for peace endeavors. 
  
The initial period of the new millennium began with heavy clashes between the GoSL 
forces and the LTTE. The LTTE captured the Elephant Pass, one of the main entrances to 
                                                 
27
 The basic assumptions are (i) effectiveness of facilitation remains mediator’s ability to remove or reduce power 
imbalances of the conflicting parties (ii) ability to reduce tension and (iii) to act on neutral basis. The detail 
description of the three assumptions is mentioned in the Chapter One.  
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the Jaffna peninsula.28  This brought tremendous losses for both sides resulting in 
hundreds of deaths and much property damage. The year 2000 triggered a number of 
LTTE suicide attacks in Colombo, the capital of Sri Lanka, together with the close 
assassination attempt targeted on Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunge, the president of 
the country. Moreover, the time had been to a greater extent a difficult period for both 
parties militarily and economically. When looking at the reports the government 
expenditure for defense increased significantly and hence, the defense allocation in year 
1999 was 54,233 million rupees and had risen up to 77,154 million rupees in year 2000.29 
Disappointingly, the sudden drop in economic growth has had a number of negative 
impacts to people’s livelihoods.30  
 
Despite some military victories, the continuous fighting caused a large number of 
casualties on the LTTE cadres and civilians. The heavy economic embargo on Jaffna 
peninsula was due to the blockade of the A-9 road31 and influenced the LTTE’s cessation 
of hostility. Subsequently, they announced a unilateral ceasefire agreement in December 
2000 and extended it further until April 2001. This was signified as a measurement to halt 
hostilities and as a gesture of goodwill which indicated their willingness for negotiations 
with the GoSL (TamilNet 2000 [online]). Soon after, the second unilateral ceasefire was 
                                                 
28
 Jaffna peninsula consists of two districts- Jaffna and Kilinochchi. Sri Lankan Tamils are the majority in these 
districts while there are Moors and a few Sinhalese. Jaffna functions as the economic and cultural capital of Sri 
Lankan Tamils (Wikipedia 2008).  Kilinochchi is currently held under the control of the LTTE. Jaffna is a militarily 
strategic location for both parties and is currently under the control of GoSL. On several occasions the city was 
exposed to military hazards. It is important to note that the Palaly military complex of the GoSL in Jaffna is the 
main supply base for the military, as well as provides the only civilian access to air transport to North and the South.   
 
29
  Annual Report 2001, Central Bank of Sri Lanka [online]. 
 
30
 According to figures presented in early 2001, the actual performance of the country’s economy proved to be far 
worse than predicted (Shastri 2002: 179[online]). The GDP growth in 2001 was negative 1.4%. This was the first 
contraction since the independence of the counrty. The economy and the daily livelyhood of the people in Sri Lanka 
hit by the heavy miitary expenditure during the second half of the year 2000. 
 
31
 A-9 road is the main passage runs form Southern part of the island to North and the main gateway to the 
government controlling Jaffna. This passage allows the main transportation and supply of goods, and daily basis 
traveling connecting from the GoSL controlling areas to the LTTE controlling areas. A-9 was opened for daily 
workafter signing the CFA in February 2002. This was after the long term blocked from entry/exit point in 
Muhamalai  and Omanthai  in Jaffna district from 1995- 2002 period. The road remained close from February, 2008. 
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enforced in December 2001 until January 2002. This decision was which was 
optimistically reciprocated by the GoSL with their own unilateral ceasefire declaration. It 
is important to remember that Norway commenced facilitation amidst these unilaterally 
declared ceasefires.  
 
Moreover, India became a close observer of the peace process. Indian opinion on the 
peace process is considered an important element for two reasons: India is the dominant 
power in the region and she has close ties with both parties.32 Interestingly for India to 
accept the Scandinavian partner shows India’s strong enthusiasm in the Sri Lankan 
negotiation processes. Added to this Hans Brattskar, the former Norwegian Ambassador 
to Sri Lanka said: 
 
“Patience is a requirement when a country assumes the role of a facilitator or a mediator. 
Indian officials stressed that Norway should not get engaged in the Sri Lankan peace 
process unless we were patient. This was underlined when Norwegian officials discussed 
our engagement in Sri Lanka with the Indian Government in the early stages of the 
process (Brattskar 2007 [Interview]).” 
 
Nevertheless there was no immediate cessation of violence and the lack of optimism was 
due to continued military attacks between the GoSL and the LTTE. The so-called the 
LTTE’s, ‘Meticulously planned operation’ (Balasingham 2004:350) targeted at the 
international airport in Sri Lanka caused 450 million USD in damage, killed eight 
security personnel and injured twelve others (Shastri 2002: 178 [online]). This caused a 
clear dropout at the early phase of negotiations.  
 
There have been several reasons for the GoSL to continue the negotiations. The GoSL 
knew that the growing military threat of the LTTE was a challenge for the well-being of 
the country. The ongoing economic depression was magnifying the problem which was 
                                                 
32
 Indian involved in Sri Lanka at the early stage of the conflict. India has militarily involved from 1987-1990 by 
deploying Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). It is mentioned by Goodhand and his colleagues that India was 
opposed to any international third party involvement in Sri Lanka, but they reluctantly agreed for Norway peace 
facilitation by being convinced for their least strategic interest in the region (Goodhand & et al. 2005). 
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going from bad to worse. Further, the newly elected UNF government which would not 
sustain itself militarily and was economically in such beaten conditions needed a shift in 
the peace strategy.   
 
The LTTE approach was rather global than purely state-centric. The increased 
international pressure on terrorism and the fear of the LTTE being subjected in the ‘war 
on terror’ was one of the foremost reasons LTTE returned for talks. The extreme 
economic sufferings and the economic instability in the Jaffna peninsula weakened the 
LTTE. Therefore, it was important for the LTTE to rebuild their image and regain their 
lost strength. Balasingham who was the theoretician and the chief negotiator of the LTTE 
claimed that dismissing the allegations of the LTTE was important before stepping into 
peace talks (Balasingham 2004:366). This was a clear ‘conditional term’ for the LTTE. 
By seeking a negotiated solution the LTTE hoped to gain international legitimacy and 
subsequent recognition as representing genuine Tamil grievances (Bose 2007). 
 
However, according to the LTTE point of view the GoSL efforts to de-proscribe the 
LTTE was not effective in considering LTTE as ‘equal’ partners in the peace process. 
This did not bring any significant impact for a ‘symmetrical’ status (Rudrakumaran 
2005). The LTTE pointed this out when they withdrew from the peace talks by ending the 
almost nine month long face-to-face talks. The LTTE withdrawal took place before the 
Tokyo Conference (the largest delegation in international economic support for 
peacemaking in Sri Lanka). The LTTE did not hesitate to accuse the Sri Lankan 
government for marginalizing them when they approached the international community 
in a U.S. led environment (Goodhand et.al 2005:21).33 Balasingam stated that 
Prabhakaran felt humiliation and the decision taken by the GoSL was totally 
unacceptable (Balasingham 2004:430).  
 
                                                 
33
 In 2001, after the ‘9/11’ incident the United States banned the LTTE. The LTTE considered the US led meeting 
was a genuine effort of the GoSL to make them exclude from international participation. 
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The insufficient commitment to gather parties into the next step forward took almost 
three years. The negotiations restarted when the parties met in Geneva in February 2006. 
At the P-TOMS they were unable to consolidate on a mutual stand in distributing 
economic resources and aid for reconstruction work. The initial stipulation for 
humanitarian relief and reconstruction called for the ‘joint mechanism’ to be established 
which was highly anticipated by the Donors including the Co-Chairs.34  The ‘joint 
mechanism’ was aimed to put the peace process back on track with the unity of the 
parties. However, upon the judgment of the Sri Lankan Supreme Court P-TOMS was 
abolished and the ‘joint mechanism’ never happened. This was a time that leftist political 
elements and some nationalistic movements in the country led mainly by JVP and JHU 
campaigned against the GoSL for opening talks with the LTTE. They alleged the            
P-TOMS was unacceptable due to the LTTE receiving an inseparable responsibility in 
administrating funds in reconstruction work. In fact, during this time an extremely 
unpopular view was raised against the Norwegian role for assisting the P-TOMS and the 
Co-Chairs.      
 
The newly elected government in November 2005 won with a marginal victory at the 
election and gave power to Mahinda Rajapakshe as the President of the country. The 
coalition government led by the head of the party UPFA (United People’s Freedom 
Alliance) bringing forth the new agenda called ‘Mahinda Chinthanaya’ which looks at 
peace negotiations through ‘honorable peace’(a notion developed in Mahinda 
Chinthanaya).  
 
The talks within the Geneva phase began with the association of the UPFA government 
in February and October 2006. The issues taken into consideration at the Geneva talks 
                                                 
34
 The International donor contribution to Peace in Sri Lanka considered as an important aspect in peacemaking 
process. The Oslo Conference in November 2002 and Tokyo Conference in June 2003 gathered large number of 
bilateral and multi-lateral Donors (The Sri Lanka’s largest Donors are considered to be Japan, Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) and World Bank). The Co-Chairs which established at the Tokyo Conference included US, EU, Japan 
and Norway. They agreed to continue regular meetings at ad-hoc level.  The Co-Chairs acted as an observer 
committee.   
 47 
were humanitarian, political processes, the de-escalation of violence, democracy and 
political pluralism. According to the government point of view, the talks were basically 
“an attempt to rein the LTTE commitment for peace and the bona fides of the assurance 
to the CFA (SCOPP 2006 [online])”. Interestingly, the LTTE argument was similarly the 
concessions of the GoSL for the urgent humanitarian crisis in Jaffna (TamilNet 28 
October 2006 [online]). The GoSL and the LTTE’s stands were mutual assessments on 
each other to assure further talks. There have been constant allegations over each other’s 
violations and nothing seemed to be possible to accommodate the parties in friendly 
terms.  
 
 
4.3 Norway’s Association in Sri Lanka    
 
It is argued that international third-party involvement in solving an ethnic conflict is a 
difficult task especially for a third-party from far away rather than a regional power. 
Accordingly, a third-party alienated to a society that provides minimum experiences of 
the root causes rather a third-party from the same affiliations. Norway coming from a far 
away place acknowledged that facilitating the Sri Lankan negotiations was a remarkable 
achievement. The signing of the CFA was the foremost achievement of the negotiations 
at the initial period.  
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During this time the constant Norwegian support led by Erik Solheim,35 who was the 
Special Peace Envoy to the negotiations, brought the parties into talks.36  
 
Norway’s involvement in Sri Lanka can be examined in several dimensions. The 
historical relationship between Norway and Sri Lanka began through development 
cooperation. Norway’s NGO (Non-Governmental Organizations) presence in Sri Lanka 
stands most historical (Moolakkattu 2005:291). This presence began when Norway 
officially commenced the development cooperation work in Sri Lanka in 1967. Norway 
economic and development endeavors became officially recognized after signing a bi-
lateral agreement in 1977 which is still largely in effect. Norway is not even the largest 
bi-lateral donor of Sri Lanka. Their contributions of aid and development assistance 
became significantly central to peace reconciliation and human rights. Norway has been 
channeling large amounts of money through their NGOs as well.37 When looking at 2004 
figures the total bi-lateral aid given to Sri Lanka was 176,450,000 Norwegian Kroner. 
This was a clear increase after the CFA (Royal Norwegian Embassy in Sri Lanka 
[online]). 
                                                 
35
 Erik Solheim was the Special Adviser to the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Currently the Minister of 
the Environment and International Development. He was the main personal figure in the Norwegian peace efforts in 
Sri Lanka.  
36
 The first round of the formal face-to face negotiations ended setting ‘ground conditions’ (continuation of CFA, 
negotiations through Norway facilitation, attending for reconstruction work) in future negotiations. There were 
regulations regarding Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and their safe return to High Security Zones (HSZs). The 
second round of talks concerned about the security situation in the North-Eastern part of the island, to improve under 
a mutually agreed plan, consequently, established three sub committees that coherent to essential recovery and 
normalcy work. These sub committees were identified as (i) Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in 
the North and East (SIHRN) (ii) De-Escalation and Normalization which concerns HSZs and IDPs (SDN). (iii) Sub 
Committee on Political Matters and later came the fourth committee (iv) Sub Committee on Gender Issues. The 
third round of talks in Oslo- perceived as a stage led for a progressive political engagement -the LTTE came up with 
the proposal on “substantial regional autonomy”- identified as ‘ Interim Self – Governing Authority (ISGA). 
According to critiques this was one of the best and optimal options that the LTTE proposed for an agreed federal 
solution. The forth round was concerned about the re-settlements and human rights issues. The fifth round 
acknowledged the need of the LTTE to stop recruitment of child soldiers and concerned more work of the sub-
committees. The sixth round hold in Japan March 2003, showed the need of a political solution, substantial and 
tangible international support for development and reconstruction work.     
 
37
 Norway’s NGO presence in Sri Lanka established the development and humanitarian work at the grass root level 
in island wide. Apart from the direct state assistance these NGO work related to peace- capability building projects 
started lobbying with different societies in Sri Lanka. 
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 Norway’s interest in reconstruction work never was an undermined factor. Added to that 
during the first round of talks in Thailand 2002 Vidar Helgesen who was the State 
Secretary of Norway raised the importance of the development work. He says that, “It is 
our common interest to provide immediate funding for practical peace building on the 
ground (Helgesen 2002; Royal Norwegian Embassy in Sri Lanka [online]).” Thus the 
economic cooperation and the development became vital for the direct and non-direct 
political participation of Sri Lanka. The role remained a multi-faceted combination of 
coordination and supervision.   
 
It is important that the relationship between Norway and Sri Lanka aggregated with the 
direct facilitation process at the peace talks. After the CFA, Norway commenced the Sri 
Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) with cooperating with the rest of the Scandinavian 
countries. The SLMM exercised as a formal monitoring mechanism on the ground that 
conducts international verification through onsite monitoring (CFA 2002 [online]). Their 
main task was “not to let minor incidents escalate into a something that would be 
politically triggered (Sjoberg 2008 [interview])”. In addition, Norway’s well wished 
initiations on development and the reconstruction work gathered large international 
support when they hosted the Oslo Conference in November 2002 and Tokyo Conference 
in June 2003 with the fifty states and twenty-two international organizations. This 
brought the idea of Norway’s aspiration for international collaboration in peacemaking.   
 
The Norwegian political level of participation which is the role as the facilitator was 
evident as a crucial task when dealing with the parties. The parties are the GoSL, as the 
main representative along with the LTTE, ‘as the sole representative of the Tamils’ and 
some other parties like in India and the Donor Community which came in near the late 
part of the negotiations. According to the GoSL Norway’s main role was, “to be the 
third-party facilitator…mainly, to bring the two parties together, and let them to decide 
what needs to be done, offering help and suggestions (Gooneratne 2007:112)”. Moreover, 
Norway identifies their role as: 
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“…as the facilitator, Norway’s role is to assist the parties in their efforts to reach a 
political solution. The nature of our efforts change according to the stage the process has 
reached. A significant part of our effort focuses on promoting understanding between the 
parties: we spend much of time acting as a channel of communication and helping them 
find common ground between their respective positions. An important part of our role a 
facilitator is also to ensure broad support for the process in the international community 
(Helgesen 2003:3)”.  
 
Norway was active in promoting an international independent monitoring mission to 
safeguard the measures of the CFA. The SLMM was initiated as a mechanism for 
cooperation between the parties. In general, Norway perceived the monitoring as a main 
tool for ‘trust building’. They believed that: 
 
 “The most challenging part in ‘Peace Diplomacy’ is not really to negotiate the treaty that 
has happened many times in different countries but what is important in a treaty is to get 
the parties to collaborate and build trust among each other. So, the monitoring 
mechanism becomes essential. The work of SLMM led Norway to engage in both 
‘facilitation’ and in a small international peace making mission with the support of their 
Scandinavian allies (Geir 2008 [Interview])”.38  
 
The mandate of the SLMM was authorized in the CFA Art.3 and says that, “The parties 
have agreed to set up an international monitoring mission to inquire into any instance of 
violation of the terms and conditions of the agreement (CFA 2002: Art.3 [online])”. The 
SLMM approximately contains a staff of fifty to sixty people (Geir 2008 [Interview]) and 
their headquarters was located in Colombo. The other head office was based in 
Kilinochchi at the LTTE controlling area and some other offices in the North-East 
province of the country.39 
 
                                                 
38
 The SLMM established with the support of Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway with the effect of the 
CFA. The SLMM reduced the representation to Norway and Iceland when the LTTE rejected the other Scandinavian 
presence after the EU banned on the LTTE in May 2006.  
 
39
 There were several SLMM District officers (DO) operated in Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa 
and Ampara covering North-East part of the country. The DO’s consisted of Local Monitoring Committee. The 
mission operated six Point of Contact (PoC) in areas called: Delft, Point Pedro, Silavatturai, Muthur, Killinochchi, 
Valaichchenai and Akkaraipattu. The SLMM Naval Monitoring Mission in Jaffna and Trincomalee were suspended 
temporary short period reporting and monitoring work. 
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It is noteworthy that the great prospects of the six-rounds brought awareness for the 
Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (RRR) work in the North- Eastern part of the 
county. It seemed both stakeholders considered reconstruction work a necessity. The 
drafted document which came as the ‘Appeal for Support’ constructed by the sub-
committee on the Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Need in the North and East 
(SIHRN) which was presented at the Oslo Conference viewed parties’ interest in 
cooperated reconstruction. This proposal could capture international attention for the 
peace process. The main question was how the international world would approach the 
idea of assisting Sri Lanka in their peace process. The Donors had their own agenda in 
peacemaking efforts in Sri Lanka. The Tokyo conference summed up that the ‘donor 
conditionality’ as if peace then increased prospects and opportunities for aid (Bruke & 
Mulakala 2005:18). The ‘Tokyo Declaration’40 composed the peace conditionality 
saying, “assistance by the donor community must be closely linked to substantial and 
parallel progress in the peace process (Press Release SCOPP: 12 September 2003 
[online])”.  In my opinion the international Donor support was a step ahead in the 
internationalization of the peace process. It required a liberal standard approach to both 
economic development and political reformation work and further favored a federal level 
solution of the conflict.  However, the attempt at the Tokyo Donor Conference did not 
totally accomplish a sustaining approach when the main parties gradually moved towards 
a confrontation after the collapse of the six-rounds.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40
 The Japanese representative Yasushi Akashi concluded the meeting stating the international community’s twofold 
objectives at the peace process. Such as (a) demonstrate the international community strong and unified commitment 
to the reconstruction and development and (b) encourage the GoSL and the LTTE to redouble their efforts to make 
further progress in the peace process (Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan [online]) 
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4.4 Norway’s Competency in the Peace Process   
 
The following discussion analyzes the three main assumptions of the study (i.e. figure 
2.2) by looking at the changing nature of the conflict and the core events of the peace 
process. This discussion looks in-depth at the question of how Norway has been effective 
at the peace process until the collapse of the Geneva talks which ended in 2006. 
 
 
4.4.1 Remove and / or Reduce Power Imbalances  
 
Norwegian facilitation commenced quite enthusiastically and promptly to end the on 
going war. It was obvious that the initial period of the peace talks seemed quite difficult 
due to the parties’ strong hostile relations. What was evident during this period was a 
mix-motive approach for both peace and war. Therefore, it is a question whether both 
parties equally wanted any peace negotiations as a genuine start for a solution.  
 
At this starting point, Norway’s interest was to compose a mutually agreed ceasefire 
instead of parties maintaining unilateral ceasefire agreements. In general a ceasefire 
agreement enables non-aggression and imposes a formal identification to the opposing 
parties. Therefore, the recognition of the opposing party turns into a partnership that 
tends to favors a continuation. Similarly, the 2002 CFA in Sri Lanka manifested in terms 
of humanitarian measure and was the essential tool for confidence-building. The CFA 
was the guidance for the GoSL and the LTTE to, “find a negotiated solution to the 
ongoing ethnic-conflict (CFA 2002 Preamble[online])”. In fact, it was the only 
framework to initiate the rest of the peace process plans and programs and the preamble 
of the CFA provided a symmetrical responsibility for both parties to end the hostilities 
and develop confidence to pursue talks. 
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For Norwegians the establishment of the CFA was an important and an essential factor 
that brought trust between the parties. Having some notable experiences at the Oslo 
channeling Norway believed, “a commitment to direct bargaining forms an essential 
threshold for commitment… and only through direct bargaining the parties will build 
trust and confidence essential to a lasting settlement (Kelleher & Toulbee 2006:483)”. 
Likewise with Norway’s past experiences the approach with Sri Lanka was also kept 
fully open for the parties engagement. Added to that, Hans Brattskar, Norwegian former 
Ambassador to Sri Lanka said: 
     
“The primary responsibility for the peace process will always remain with the parties to 
the conflict. It is important to remember that the parties did not ask Norway to assume the 
role as a mediator but as a facilitator. Norway has received its mandate as a facilitator 
from the parties to the conflict and has not been acting on behalf of - or with a mandate - 
from the wider international community. It is crucial to understand this basic premise for 
our work when our work as facilitator is analyzed and evaluated (Brattskar 2007 
[Interview]).” 
 
Norwegian facilitation that had the task of opening the talks was largely engaged with the 
messenger role between the parties at the initial period of forming the CFA. They 
believed the CFA would gradually contribute to enhance the parties’ friendship and trust 
in each other. The fact that Norwegians looked for venues of winning the parties’ support 
in development was an opportunity for them to implement the CFA successfully. So how 
did the CFA contribute to the peace process? According to the GoSL point of view, “the 
government had to place enormous amount of trust on the Norwegian facilitator as an 
honest broker (Gooneratne 2007:11). The LTTE late chief negotiator conveyed 
compliments to “the Norwegian facilitators for being patient, untiring and skilful effort in 
formalizing and finalizing a ceasefire framework acceptable to the warring parties 
(Balasingham 2004:360)”. With the formation of the CFA the parties seemed to step into 
further collaborations that lead to the face-to-face talks. It is important to note how the 
initial stage of negotiations was vital in terms of flexibility within the parties in 
normalizing the armed struggle with cessation of direct violence as the priority.  
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Moreover, the CFA has enabled the parties to work together at three levels. Firstly, the 
CFA created an atmosphere for parties to keep faith in each other in dealing with the 
modalities of the truce. Parties were bound to cease offensive military operations. These 
operations were the cessation of land, air and naval strikes, separation of armed forces 
and the initiation of the Forward Defense Line (FDL) which separates the GoSL and the 
LTTE controlling areas. It gave recognition of each parties controlling land. The freedom 
of movement was respected by opening the A-9 road and permitting free movement from 
the North to the South (CFA 2002: Art.1 [online]). Secondly, the CFA restored normalcy 
on the ground that considers the civilians livelihoods (CFA 2002: Art.2 [online]). This 
enabled the parties to look at joint reconstruction and rehabilitation work. Thirdly, the 
implementation of the SLMM an independent international monitoring mission was vital 
as enforcement to the CFA.  
 
Norway’s accomplishment with the fresh commitments to the CFA that altered the power 
discrepancies of the parties have been cooperative and accommodative. Apart from 
Norway’s continuality the parties were also willing to accept a profitable institutional 
package. The parties had their own prioritized interest in accepting it.  The LTTE seemed 
to be pleased with the changing political role which they had not experienced in any other 
earlier negotiation processes. Thus, political pluralism became subjected at their political 
level activities. The LTTE acquired fairly good concessions from the GoSL and vise 
versa at the sub committee work which was something that the parties never tried before. 
With the gradual acceptance of each other’s plans, confessions of wrong doing and the 
realization of faults and obstinacies the six-rounds became meaningful.  
 
The sub-committees composed of the GoSL and the LTTE representatives have had the 
opportunity for mutual social-economic and political participation. There were two 
important proposals drafted. The first one was the attempt for a joint reconstruction work 
called North-East Reconstruction Fund (NERF) which was drafted by the SIHRN. The 
second proposal was the LTTE political proposal for the interim self- determination 
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known as ‘Interim- Self Governing Authority (ISGA proposal)41 which came from the 
Oslo meeting in November 2002. This proposal was viewed as a hope for a future federal 
solution the LTTE major output for an internal governing plan with a federal system of 
governance. 
 
 
4.4.2 Strategic Choice for Tension Reduction 
 
Norway’s power to manipulate the parties to stop military strikes or provoke a cessation 
of violence was very limited. The Norwegians in particular did not claim to use power as 
‘punishment’ during the negotiation rounds. In my recent interview with Hanssen Bauer 
he stated: 
 
 “Norway will not have any kind of leverage at present in Sri Lanka. We do not have 
military presence on the ground. We do not threat on going by militarily. We do not put 
sanctions to either party. Whereas, our main contribution is rather to help the parties 
through facilitating communication to find ways in negotiations (Bauer 2007 
[Interview])”. 
 
However, Norwegians did use alternative tools to encourage the parties and make them 
engage in less violence. These alternatives were found in two ways: the establishment of 
an independent international monitoring body for ceasefire monitoring and strategic 
choice for use of ‘carrots’ as compensations for development and reconstruction work. 
Norwegians were often convinced the readiness of the parties to uphold the CFA 
regulations and their dedication to protect human rights and continue reconstruction 
work. Therefore, their strategies for the reduction of tension were sort of ‘inducements’ 
to encourage parties for cooperation and confidence-building rather than pure 
‘punishments’ to manipulate parties in negotiations. In practice, these inducements 
                                                 
41
 According to the LTTE point of view, the ISGA came as a draft of the LTTE’s idea about the ‘self-determination 
in internal and external aspects. The ISGA claimed substantial regional autonomy and self-government of the 
Tamils. The LTTE viewed the proposal as a feasible detachment of rebuilding the Tamil homeland with internal and 
external rights (Balasingham 2004: 403-407). Nevertheless, the ISGA was denied by the GoSL as they identified the 
proposal as unconstitutional and violating the sovereign status of the country. 
 
 56 
impact a gradual willingness for the parties’ commitment to end the direct military 
confrontation. This brought optimism for a future political settlement hence, Norway’s 
inducements seemed effective. The most productive years were the period from February 
2002 until the first quarter of the year 2003. During this time the SLMM reported a clear 
drop in war-related deaths and political killings (i.e figure 4.3).  
 
The Norwegian facilitators saw that their presence in an internationally cooperated 
mission would lead to an effective monitoring but as a less forceful mechanism so the 
parties could pay more respect and trust in Norway’s facilitation.  The SLMM district 
offices reported on a day to day basis with military and non-military violations.42 This 
reporting and monitoring influenced the parties to maintain their discipline. The fact that 
the SLMM monitoring always opened to international observation was a virtual ‘stick’ to 
both sides to maintain a good-image at the international level. Added to that the former 
political advisor to the SLMM explains how the monitoring managed to minimize 
violations: 
 
“The SLMM responsibility was witnessed on the ground and record violations.  The work 
of SLMM recording the violations made the hurdle for violations to escalate. It was much 
easier for parties to violate the CFA if there had not been an international independent 
third party to verify it. In fact, without a monitoring mechanism there would be no way 
for the international community to know what was actually happened (Sjoberg 2008 
[Interview])”.  
 
The statistics for the period 2002-2006 in the following figures show the increase of the 
CFA violations. It showed a continued increase of violations by both parties. The 
percentage increase by the GoSL in the year 2006 report almost doubled. The LTTE 
violations were continuous and the highest in terms of the number of violations. The 
GoSL’s highest number of violations was categorized by harassments, abduction of 
                                                 
42The CFA considered military actions were as firing of direct and indirect weapons, armed raids, ambushes, 
assassinations, abduction, destruction of civilian and military property, sabotage, suicide mission and deep 
penetration units; aerial bombardment, offensive naval operations (The CFA 2002 Art.1.2[online]). In addition, the 
CFA defined hostile acts against civilians as torture, intimidation, abduction, extortion and harassments. There was 
no exact definition provided for ‘non-military’ actions.  
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adults and hostile actions against civilians. The LTTE was engaging in child recruiting, 
abduction of adults and harassments.    
 
This figure shows the statistics about the CFA violations by the parties from 2002-2006. 
 
 
Figure 3   Number of Ceasefire Violations Committed by the GoSL and the LTTE 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                        Cumulative Statistics of Number of Ceasefire Violations Committed  
 
             Source: Ceasefire Violations 2002-2007, The Official website of Sri Lanka’s  
                        Government Secretariat for the Co-Ordinating the Peace Process.  
                           The reports prepared according to the date provided by the SLMM  
 
 
How did Norway use inducements? In actual negotiation processes the third party 
assistance for compensation is a favorable element that encourages the conflicting parties 
bargaining process.  In this context, Norway as a wealthy partner was an encouragement 
for the parties to associate with. According to Norwegian strategies (White Paper No.19 
A Changing World 43), “peace-building can contribute to prevent armed conflict from 
breaking out and also create a basis for the peaceful conflict resolution while the armed 
                                                 
43
 White Paper No19, En verden i endering (A Changing World) reported how Norwegian development assistance 
use for peace and democratization processes. The paper explained Norwegian policies of contributions towards 
South in economic, social and political changes (Hauge 2004:7 [online]).  
 
Year The 
GoSL* 
% 
Percentage 
Change 
The 
LTTE* 
% 
Percentage 
Change 
Feb,2002- 
Aug 2004 
111 - 2439 - 
Feb,2002- 
Aug,2005 
141 27.03% 3113 27.63% 
Feb,2002- 
Aug,2006 
276 95.74% 4176 34.15% 
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conflict is still going on… (Hauge 2004:8 [online])”. In practice, Norway was ready to 
increase the share of aid and development assistance for reconstruction projects.  The 
LTTE was very delighted to continue the talks with the Norwegian presence so 
Norwegians could provide financial support for the LTTE’s civil capacity-building work. 
This was indeed an encouragement at the conflict de-escalation process. Acquiring 
financial assistance had deviated the LTTE’s attention from military into more 
humanitarian and political dialogue. The economic growth which resulted during that 
year in the North-East part was noteworthy.44  
 
The Oslo Donor Conference began a few days before the third round of peace talks 
December 2002. Norway declared that, “for the peace process to succeed, popular 
support for peace must be sustained and that people must see tangible benefits of peace in 
their daily lives and without significant international assistance this opportunity will be 
lost (Jan Petersen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Balasingham 2004:391)”. The Norwegian 
consideration in peacemaking to engage in ‘demonstrating real peace dividends that 
benefit the people on the ground’ resulted in a promise of 30 million USD in financial 
support in that session. Consequently, the Co-Chairs broadened the aspect Norway’s 
peacemaking efforts. According to Norwegian perception the international collaboration 
in development work seemed to be vital in comprehensive peacemaking process: 
 
“The Donor community contribution to the peace process is very important… It helps to 
reduce the suffering of the people. It will gradually increase the safety of the daily lives 
(Bauer 2007 [Interview])”.  
 
In practice, the Donors had their own agenda in peacemaking. They appealed to the 
parties in a political solution based on power sharing and a federal system of government. 
It was clear when look at the ‘Donor conditionality’ in Tokyo Declararion. This was 
                                                 
44
 When looking at the regional economic growth the Northern Province grew by an average of 12.6% during the 
post-CFA (2002-2003) period compared to 3.4% during the pre-CFA (1997-2001) period and the GDP of the 
Eastern Province increased by 10.1% per annum during the post-CFA period compared to 4.6% during the pre-CFA 
period (SCOPP [online]) 
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strongly insisted on by the Donors at the tsunami reconstruction work. Interestingly the 
Donor’s appeal was important in their association in Sri Lanka’s ‘ground-level’ 
development-reconstruction work. When it came to the Tsunami, the Co-Chairs and the 
Donors’ requisition become effective enough to drive the parties to signing the P-TOMS. 
And in this context, the Donors’ ad-hoc status was not an undermining factor for the 
parties to reject what the international community wanted. 
 
When it comes to Geneva talks in February 2006 the Donor’s insistence to re-start peace 
talks was quite effective with the association of the international world. There have been 
some recommendations from the Donors on substantial issues to the forth coming peace 
talks. At the foremost, the US was very concerned about the increased violence in Sri 
Lanka.  Nicholas Burns who was the US State Secretary for Political Affairs claimed how 
this international focus was important to, “reinforce the ceasefire to convince the parties 
to agree to resume negotiations. And they can see negotiations succeed so that peace can 
be restored (America.gov; Telling America’s Story 2006 [online])”. Similarly, the Co-
Chairs insisted on the need for re-invigorating the peace process. What was considered as 
vital was the increase of military offensiveness and continuation of human rights 
violations at both parties.  
 
Norway became very active in facilitating the Geneva phase in several ways. They 
engaged in Donor community appeal through initiating direct procedural strategies for 
the cessation of violence.  This became a different type of approach for Norway’s 
facilitation whether or not these endeavors were totally successful. There have been a 
number of visits by the Norwegian Special Envoy, Jon Hanssen Bauer, to communicate 
between the two parties and insist on the importance of re-engaging in negotiations. 
According to Bauer: 
 
 “The LTTE felt that coming to talks for the second time in Geneva is a major concession 
showing that they are willing to talk (Bauer 2007 [interview])”. 
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At this juncture, Norway’s pressure on the LTTE was relatively high. They tried to show 
the negative consequences of hostility the EU posture had towards the LTTE, the stand of 
Canada and the US on the LTTE terror acts, the international pressure on recruitment of 
child soldiers, and continued armed confrontation were significant. Norwegians deeply 
insisted the need of the safety measures for the perilous security situation. They were not 
only concerned with the future stand of the SLMM.  Strictly speaking, at the Geneva 
phase Norway was outspoken about the need for a very quick settlement of the conflict. 
 
During the two sessions of Geneva talks Norway was eager to encourage conditions of 
normalcy such as the parties disengaging in direct hostilities. Norway seemed to be 
looking for effective bargaining tools to persuade the parties to the change their positions. 
According to the Norwegian point of view the period between the Geneva meetings in 
February and October 2006 approximately nine months of that time became crucial for 
active facilitation. Norwegian Special Envoy Bauer said: 
 
“During April, May and June 2006 I was using the ‘stick’ on the level of argumentation. I 
explained the LTTE about all the political reasons why they should returned to the peace 
process. I tried to find a way of convening a central command. That did not happen 
(Bauer 2007 [Interview])”. 
 
 
 
4.4.3 The Neutral Image 
 
Norway considers ‘neutrality’ an effective source in peacemaking. Having had some 
international experiences, Norway encounters that its neutral role is typically made 
possible by the fact that it is not a major power and has few vested interests  (Helgesen 
2003:6). The fact the GoSL and the LTTE accepted the Norwegian facilitation and placed 
great interest in returning to the peace process in 2002 signified Norway’s willingness 
over the parties’ mutual acceptance of their role.  There were some important reasons for 
the parties’ acceptance. The basic reason was that Norway seemed to be disinterested in 
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geo-political strategies in Sri Lanka. The fact that Norway did not hold any military 
threat to the parties was taken into consideration as well. Sri Lanka having had bitter 
experiences of the Indian military presence in 1987-1990 was in fact influenced to accept 
a less forceful party like Norway. The former Norwegian Ambassador in Sri Lanka, at 
my recent interview admitted: 
 
“Norway’s lack of history as a colonial power and our extensive experience in other 
peace processes were other reasons for choosing our country as the facilitator for the 
peace process. Norway is also a country without security interests in South Asia and with 
very limited economic interests in Sri Lanka. All these factors made it possible for the 
Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the LTTE to ask Norway to facilitate the peace 
process (Brattskar 2007 [Interview]).  
 
However, Norway’s role in Sri Lanka has been always subjected to determining how long 
and how productive the peace talks would continue. Norway was the bridge-builder 
between the two parties thus they became an obvious important party in the peace 
process. The crucial task of being the only communicator between the two parties became 
important for Norway when protecting the image of impartiality which should prevail in 
the peace process. In fact, the parties desired Norway to remain in the peace process as 
the only potential (external) third-party during peace talks.45  
 
During several occasions Norway accomplished winning the parties acceptance. For 
example at the early stage of negotiations their role in drafting the CFA and the 
continuation of six-rounds of peace talks. The establishment of the SLMM and the Co-
Chairs brought some optimism for Norway to act substantially. According to the 
Norwegian point of view, the SLMM and the Co-Chairs could have worked progressively 
with the respect of the parties (2007 [Interview]). In other words Norway’s contributions 
progressed with the parties respect. 
                                                 
45
  The history of the peace process (refer Chapter One) shows the third–party involvement in the Sri Lanka’s 
conflict. The only third-party was India. Due to the parties strong hostile views, there has been no potential foreign 
third party entered to negotiations other than India. Even though United Kingdom, Australia and France were 
considered as potential parties, the warring parties were unable to agree on mutual stand.  
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Norway remained in the peace talks during three governments in Sri Lanka.46 The last 
two governments (under presidency of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunge and 
Mahinda Rajapakshe) and the association of the key coalition party JVP had political 
disagreements on continuing the peace process with Norway’s facilitation. JVP 
repeatedly opposed Norwegian facilitation considering their role as an unnecessary 
foreign intervention. In this context, the last two governments’ decision to withhold the 
Norwegian facilitation became crucial. In the midst of such political disagreements for 
Norway to resume the facilitation process was a challenge to hold with popular support.  
 
 
4.5 Why did Norway Fail in the Peace Process? 
 
The previous discussion examined the extent to which Norway has been effective in the 
negotiations for the past few years through direct facilitation and development work. 
Despite some productive achievements Norway has not fully accomplished peacemaking 
and peace-building processes in Sri Lanka. There have been several reasons for such 
drawbacks. The following discussion attempts to examine the reasons for such failures.     
 
According to the ‘Contingency Model’ (i.e figure 2.1) the mediation outcome can be 
expected by examining both context and process variables. The main assumptions47 
describe a broad perspective for the role of the facilitation. Evidently, contextual 
elements in Sri Lanka’s conflict and facilitator’s procedural variables altogether were less 
effective for the total productiveness of Norway’s role in practice. The following 
discussion examines the questions why and how Norway became insufficient in their 
approach for sustainable peacemaking in the Sri Lankan peace process.     
 
                                                 
46
 Norway was facilitating the peace process under the United National Front (UNF) government, the United 
People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) government from April, 2004-2005 and finally the current government.  
 
47
 Refer Chapter One for more details about the  basic assumptions 
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4.5.1 Lack of Ability and Willingness in Peacemaking 
 
The civil war situation and protracted militarism in the Sri Lankan conflict obviously 
made peacemaking a difficult task. In fact, the changing aptitudes of the parties, 
asymmetrical military and political capabilities increased hostility which became a 
continuous challenge for a rigid political settlement. Norway entered in the peacemaking 
process where the achievement of peacemaking and peace dividends were doubtful. 
Hence, a strong and an ambitious effort were required from the Norwegian side.   
 
An assessment of the CFA’s actual practice with the parties’ involvement is important in 
order to know how far Norway was able to build confidence between parties. Simply, the 
CFA was often entrenched as a tool for trust and cooperation but has been often used as a 
tool for argumentation during peace talks. The CFA regulation for truce modalities was 
the main disagreement between the parties. They were distant to restore normalcy 
because the parties made their own military decisions to withhold necessary ground 
activities such as maintaining HSZs and procurement of military items. Interestingly, the 
CFA in 2002 was the first comprehensive truce that the parties experienced during more 
than two decade old military conflict. The parties had few experiences of upholding a 
ceasefire agreement at a mutual stand which had never happened under an international 
monitoring body. 
 
Not only the malpractice of the CFA but also the inherited mistrust decreased the 
confidence between the parties. For example, the GoSL attempts to de-proscribe the 
LTTE by giving them political recognition was not perceived as a genuine goodwill 
gesture. They had been continuously appealing for a symmetrical approach basically at a 
military and administrative level. Were these LTTE requisitions acceptable to the GoSL? 
The CFA had already provided semi-governance to the LTTE in their controlling areas, 
such as in Kilinochchi and Mulathiuv. Moreover the LTTE’s, ISGA proposal was the 
administrative level proclamation for ‘regional-autonomy and self-determination’ of the 
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LTTE controlling areas. This was according to late Balasingham (Balasingham 
2004:405-407) who claimed for de-jure status for their ‘Tamil homeland’. This proposal 
was not acceptable to the GoSL for several reasons. One was the fact that ISGA crossed 
the constitution in Sri Lanka and the other was an attempt to implement an overwhelming 
‘Eelam’ statehood which was unacceptable to the GoSL. Besides, the GoSL often 
proclaimed the need to protect the national integrity and the sovereignty of the country. 
On the other hand a separate ‘Eelam State’ became more rigid and verbally constructed in 
the LTTE’s political debate. With the increase of such strong resistance of the parties 
stand for exclusive ideas of political separation Norwegian efforts became more difficult.  
 
However, Norway perceived the positions of the parties as not easily removable just 
through mere facilitation. The principle of inherited powers of the facilitation that do not 
employ force or leverage to manipulate the parties apply in Sri Lankan conflict. Likewise 
in many other facilitation processes, the only option for the Norwegian side was to 
channel between the parties until they signaled cooperation. However, it is a question 
whether Norway’s facilitation sufficient enough to build the necessary trust between the 
parties.  
 
The Norwegian facilitation was not sufficient enough to lead the task of effective 
communication. At this crucial point- the LTTE’s withdrawal from the sixth round of 
talks symbolized Norway’s ineffectiveness in confidence-building. The short term cause 
for the LTTE’s decision was due to misperception rather than a military controversy. The 
LTTE viewed the Washington Conference prior to the Tokyo Conference as a clear 
isolation of their party in front of the ‘US-led’ donor community which conflicted against 
the GoSL and Norway’s measurements. It is noted by the LTTE that the GoSL and 
Norwegians, being fully aware that US had legal constraints, which prevented the 
invitation of the LTTE’s representation in Washington (Shanmugaratnam & Stokke 
2004:19).  
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Moreover Norway appeared at the Geneva phase after being aloof of three years. Their 
re-appearance in the midst of heavy clashes and growing antagonism created doubts of 
their continuation. There have been some other crucial security concerns in the Eastern 
part of the country with the emergence of the paramilitary groups of the Karuna faction 
after March 2004.48 The continuous violations of the CFA and the standing position of 
the SLMM were also main issues at this phase. Norwegians efforts to use the ‘stick’ at 
the level of argumentation and ‘carrots’ in terms of international inducements were mere 
reasons that parties do not seemed to pay enough respect to. (Here I will use the word 
‘inducements’ because Norway themselves did not used ‘pressure’-a real forceful 
approach to push parties over negotiations except the task of lobbying with the US and 
EU for their attainments in growing humanitarian concerns in Sri Lanka). During this 
phase, Norway was unable to cooperate with the parties to remove mistrust between them 
or reduce growing tension.49  
 
Norway’s effective engagement even at the most active period of six-rounds is 
questionable. If the immediate cessation of violence was impractical in a protected 
militarized conflict a small reduction of military offence is noteworthy. Contrarily, in Sri 
Lanka the parties continued directly accusing each others for breaking the truce. The 
GoSL was concerned that the LTTE’s main violations were: arms shipments/ 
proliferation under the shield of fisheries, recruitment of child soldiers and infringing the 
GoSL’s FDL and HSZs. The former GoSL Secretary of Defense noted that the 
government forces were unable to remove the LTTE enemy status instantly and they 
continued to suspect the LTTE peace motives (Fernando 2006:48). Contrarily, the LTTE 
had their own allegations against the GoSL’s violations. The LTTE often claimed that 
                                                 
48
 Karuna who was the chief commander of the LTTE in East has moved out from the LTTE by creating another 
Tamil military group in Eastern part of Sri Lanka. It is argued that this faction created a division within ‘LTTE 
supporters’.   
 
49
 The year 2006 resulted heavy clashes in sea and land. The incident that the LTTE ‘Sea Tigers’ failed attack to 
Pear Cruiser II  carrying 710 passengers, and continued naval attacks between the both parties became significant in 
the sea. The military offensive in the land in Sampur and Muttur were fatal. The parties opened cross firing at 
Maavilaru waterway incident when the LTTE blocked the waterway to Eastern farming lands.   
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they were disappointed of the general practice of how the CFA provoked a power of 
asymmetry between the main parties (Balasingham 2004:426-427). This was perceived as 
an infringement of the ‘Tamil-self determination’. The process of judicial and 
administrative practices within the LTTE was located in Killinochchi and Mulathivu. 
They claimed more power and freedom in separation of the forces and free movement in 
the land (in these controlling areas) and in the sea. Further, Tamil civilians questions of 
re-settlement in GoSL military occupation zones and the Tamil humanitarian question 
became main concerns during the talks.50 
  
Interestingly, the LTTE military stand identified to be an essential factor for their state-
making process. Therefore, for them the disarmament and disengagement in military 
activities seemed further enlarging asymmetry between the parties, so it is doubted 
whether the LTTE wanted to de-militarize during the peace process. The GoSL viewed 
the existence of their armed forces and HSZs in the North-East provinces important to 
maintain power in the North-East. The opposing military stand has always been a 
challenge for Norway’s facilitation to consolidate between both parties interest at a 
mutual stand. In practice, both parties’ military enhancements were a tool for bargaining 
during the talks.  
 
These overwhelming military concerns on the one hand left humanitarian and 
development concerns marginal. On the other hand there has been less concern of the 
other parties’ representation in the peace process (in Sri Lanka the peace process always 
subjected to orientate between two main parties- the GoSL and the LTTE, and there has 
been significant involvement of Sri Lanka’s Muslim Congress-SLMC).   
                                                 
50
 According to the Official Website of Internal Displacement Monitoring Center-by the end of 2006 the total 
number of IDPs were 520,000. It is a combination of victims of ongoing conflict and Tsunami. These victims are 
primarily from Tamil and Muslim communities in North-East province. The CFA signed in 2002 allowed some 
418,500 IDPs from the original conflict induced caseload of 735,000 to return to their homes during between 2002 -
2006.  However, the violence and terrorist attacks caused thousands to again leave their homes and escape for safety 
(UN Office for the Coordination of the Humanitarian Affairs [online]). And the re-settlements at the HSZs are not 
effective due to unclear security status.  
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When questioning Norway’s task in the reduction of violence, the ceasefire agreement 
and the SLMM were the main enforcements. Even though the CFA came as an intangible 
source that provided the parties a role to maintain discipline to protect and safeguard 
cooperation, there has been minimal willingness to uphold it during this time. The initial 
period of the CFA was quite significantly reduced number of war killings.51 However, 
after the six-rounds violence increased (i.e figure 4.3). The foremost of such violations 
were breaches of the modalities of the ceasefire (CFA 2002 Art.1 [online]).  
 
In this context, Norway was ineffective in the use of contingent tactics in confidence-
building process. This has been a negative impact to the well being of the peace process. 
It is important to note that Norway’s role of just being a facilitator caused them to avoid 
suggesting security concerns. The act on ‘internal matters’ were considered by 
Norwegians as an act beyond the scope of facilitation. Therefore it was not preferable to 
them. Norway was very much limited in terms of being more than a communicator or a 
commentator. Even the communicator role became ineffective when looking at how the 
pieces of messages were not sufficient for parties to remove mistrust. Most of the time 
this exchanges of information was subjected for misperceptions and hard-line criticisms.  
 
Interestingly, the SLMM which was established for monitoring violence was the only 
stick the Norwegians had to direct the parties for cooperation and refinement. However, 
was the SLMM overall performance a confidence-building role? The fact that the SLMM 
was just kept for ‘monitoring/reporting’ and restricted for military enforcement was less 
forceful in eliminating the ceasefire violations Norway avoided using contingent tactics 
in terms of punishing the parties for destructive interaction. Simply, there has been no 
‘pressure’ from the SLMM over the parties. In spite of the SLMM daily reporting of 
                                                 
51
 The SLMM recorded a total of 380 complaints of cease fire violations since the agreement was signed over five 
months ago. There were 270 complaints have been made against the LTTE and 110 against the GoSL, BBC News, 
URL:  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2116534.stm . 
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violations the mission was obtained less popular due to their inability to support the 
sources of verifications. This has been a challenge for Norwegians to verify reliability of 
their reporting work. Norway admits that, “sometimes it has been difficult to make a 
judgment on what actually happened, just by looking at reports (Geir 2008 [interview])”. 
In addition, the SLMM had their technical and logistical difficulties for full coverage of 
monitoring areas. The missions limited number of staff and with less support from the 
parties made the task more difficult. The SLMM functioned with the support of Norway 
and Iceland in 2006 it consequently reduced the credible commitment of the mission. In 
the midst of internal political controversy and the parties increased hostility, the ability of 
the SLMM became weak. 
 
However, Norway’s power to reward the parties for economic well-being was vital. The 
strong willingness of Norway for real peace dividends had been for a greater extent used 
in this context. They used aid and development assistance. Did these endeavors advanced 
the parties for favorable moves in cooperation? Norway’s development aid is not the 
main bulk that Sri Lanka receives internationally. When looking at the Central Bank 
reports in Sri Lanka, Japan is the largest bi-lateral donor and there are some important 
multi-lateral donors such as Asian Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank (WB) in 
international aid support. Norway’s direct bi-lateral aid to Sri Lanka is not as mentioned 
before but Norway has been a continuous partner for humanitarian and development 
funding through various government and non-governmental level channels to Sri Lanka. 
Therefore Norway’s inclusion or exclusion of aid and development assistance in Sri 
Lanka was not considered as a crucial factor to decide which way the peace process to be 
headed in the parties’ preference. 
 
Did Norway’s humanitarian and development support enhance peace in Sri Lanka? 
Interestingly, more often during the peace process the parties had their opposing views 
against each other in joint development work. It is clear when looking at SIHRN the only 
institutional body for joint reconstruction work built in 2002, “SIHRN lacked the legal 
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status to receive and disburse funds…no clear procedures regarding its relationships to 
government ministries and other institutional dealings; the SIHRN was virtually crippled 
as a result (Shanmugaratnam & Stokke 2004:16)”. The lack of a mutually agreed political 
stand for fund raising negatively influenced the parties cooperation. This was significant 
in two main occasions, the first was at the Tokyo Conference in May, 2003 and the 
second at the signing of the P-TOMS in 2005. Regardless of the massive amount of 
international pledges there was at least respect from the parties to persist in peace talks.   
 
The community level of dialogue for humanitarian relief is also a crucial factor in the 
process of peacemaking in Sri Lanka. In this context, a large number of displaced Muslim 
communities in the eastern part of the conflicting areas were isolated from humanitarian 
relief. Nevertheless, they were the worst affected in the eastern confrontation and 
tsunami. This signified the failure of community level participation in the decision-
making for the peace process. Even though little optimism was brought for Muslim 
representation through Norwegian funded Muslim Peace Secretariat in 2005. It remained 
inconsistent with the funding to others. If the peace dividends aim is for humanitarian 
reconstruction and improvement of the well-being of the people who suffer at the war, 
then the goal in Sri Lanka is yet to be achieved. 
 
  
4.5.2 Criticism on Norway Neutral Image  
 
The role of Norway as a neutral body was a fact argued very much in the Sri Lankan 
political panorama during the peace process. The arguments raised were twofold. Firstly, 
from those who refused that the theory of neutrality exists in real world politics and those 
who were against the so-called neutral image of Norway. Secondly, from those who 
mistrusted the Norwegian brokering as a reliable contribution in negotiations were 
skeptical about Norway’s impartiality. The reasonings are as follows:  
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The connection of Norway’s foreign policy and their strategic interest in Sri Lanka, 
viewed as that because of Norway’s interest in fisheries and oil resources. In fact, 
Norway was viewed working on their international reputation in peacemaking missions 
and also to solicitating political support for refugee population 12,757 which are Sri 
Lankan Tamil refugees currently live in Norway.52 It was discussed that Norway 
maintains a hidden agenda behind their peace motives. Theses arguments were raised on 
several occasions. Norway hosted Donor meetings which were perceived as an 
unnecessary involvement that exceeded the given role as a mere facilitator. Norway’s 
foreign policy for anti-terrorism in general and their support for the LTTE fund raising in 
particular were viewed as a double standard incentive, which is politically incorrect. This 
became more significant when the United States and several other countries including 
Canada, United Kingdom and the European Union took measures for freezing Tamil 
Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) assets, which was the main source of financial 
support for the LTTE. The Tamils who live in Norway who continued to raise funds 
exposed an idea about Norway’s partiality.  
 
However, it is doubted these strong public criticisms over Norway’s role negatively 
impacted the good-relations between the parties. The outspoken view in southern politics 
in Sri Lanka, known to be the fundamental nationalists led by JVP and JHU, drew an 
extreme challenge to Norway’s role as “pro-Tigers” and as “New- Imperialists”.  The 
foremost Norwegian political figure Erik Solheim, was also criticized for being ‘pro-
LTTE’.  
 
It is important to note that I do not conclude Norway’s actual role of ‘neutrality’ as partial 
or impartial in spite of lack of tangible and concrete evidence. Thus, I am unable to 
examine this particular debate in a comprehensive manner through this study. 
 
                                                 
52
 According to the Norwegian demographic statistics the total number of Sri Lankan immigrants lives in Norway- 
12,757 in January 2007, URL: http://www.ssb.no/emner/02/01/10/innvbef/tab-2007-05-24-05.html. 
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Norway’s point of view for such criticisms is unavoidable when just a single party 
provides facilitation between strong hostile groups. Especially in the middle of a task that 
employs much communication and exchanged information. Added to that my recent 
interview with a Norwegian Foreign Ministry official who said:  
 
“Norway being not impartial has been a constant challenge, but the strength of the 
criticism has varied. When the peace process was going well people stopped blaming 
Norway. When there were set backs people started to complain about our role. That is to 
be expected (Stangeland 2007 [interview])”.   
 
Added to that Hans Brattskar who was a key figure at the peace process during 2003-
2007 says; 
 
“There is not ONE unified peace movement in Sri Lanka even though many NGO’s have 
been active supporters of the peace process. There are, however, many groups that have 
worked very hard from day one to kill the peace process. They have significant political 
influence in Sri Lanka and have presented a very biased opinion of the peace process and 
the facilitator. These groups have rejected every invitation to meet with Norway for a 
discussion about the peace process and have preferred to concentrate on their efforts to 
halt the process.  All Norwegian contact with the LTTE and every visit to Kilinochchi has 
been denounced by these groups (Brattskar 2007 [Interview]).    
 
These arguments and counter arguments show how difficult and sensitive the issue of 
facilitation is in actual practice in Sri Lanka. This is a very interesting dimension of 
international peacemaking in internal conflict where the third-party is subjected to 
criticism. These arguments in Sri Lanka, in my opinion were political platform for those 
who struggle in the political panorama over a time. They have been rather less 
constructive for establishing a comprehensive peace initiative in Sri Lanka. As a matter 
of fact even the few logical criticisms that existed have had little opportunity to be 
constructive in society.    
  
In conclusion, Norway’s peace endeavors have halted after January 2008. This is after six 
years of facilitation in the Sri Lankan peace process, as only third-party and the only 
long-standing peace facilitator. The role of Norway’s effectiveness in Sri Lanka resulted 
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both useful and/or not useful in the real practice. This type of a practice is often a 
challenge to the so-called theoretical aspect of international mediation. When examining 
Norway’s role what was evident was that the active period of Norway was limited for 
almost one year during the six-rounds from 2002-2003 and Norway became insufficient 
during the rest of the four years. The CFA which was the primary achievement of 
Norway’s facilitation is abrogated at this time. The only external enforcement that 
Norway used was the international Donor inducements rather pressure, parties to return 
for negotiations which was also not used as a pacifying approach in the long run. It is 
noteworthy that frequently existing ‘political vacuum’ in Sri Lanka avoided a 
constructive dialogue for sustainable peace. The last chapter provides an overview about 
the main outcomes of Norway’s facilitation for the past six-years in Sri Lanka.  
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Chapter 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The Sri Lanka’s current situation remains an open military struggle between the GoSL 
armies and the LTTE. There is no CFA and no SLMM the with continuation of Norway’s 
facilitation. Therefore, my conclusion brings no suggestions for Norway’s future 
initiations in Sri Lanka. Despite the long run negotiations what is evident is the increase 
antagonism which resulted in a land, air and sea military clashes causing the failure of 
Norway’s facilitation as a whole. 
 
Unlike many other internal disputes the Sri Lankan conflict is a profound example of an 
internal conflict with deep structural asymmetry, powerful protagonism and prolonged 
militarism. The Sinhala-Tamil question has been militarized with the involvement of each 
other forces in direct military attacks which increased in gross violence after the ‘Black 
July’ incident in 1983. The military struggle changed its outlook from a ‘civil war’ to 
‘ethnic-conflict’ when it was prolonged for more than two decades on the island. The 
main stakeholders in several times looked whether they could agree on a mutual basis 
agreement and the ability to uphold a common settlement far to be experienced. 
 
The third-party became a coherent element in mediation with the Indian involvement 
from 1985. This was when India hosted the Thimpu talks. India’s closed affiliation to the 
Tamil question made Sri Lanka’s conflict regionalized. As a matter of fact this caused 
tremendous influences through political, military and ethnic means. On the other hand the 
question of regionalization and/or internationalization of the Tamil discourse53 rather 
                                                 
53
 Large number of Tamils who became victims of ‘Back July’ and were ‘refugees’ due to military confrontation in 
North-East and some other parts of the country have flew abroad. Most of them now live in India, UK, Canada, 
Australia, some parts of Scandinavia and Europe. Although all the Tamils do not favor the LTTE stand for an 
‘Eelam State’ their ethnic affiliation and destroyed social-cultural inheritance are inclusive to maintain a strong 
poplar discourse about the ‘Tamil question/ Tamil rights’ in Sri Lanka.   
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brought a potential impact to the conflict. In other words international world became 
more aware of the situation in Sri Lanka. 
 
 However all the governments were in power 1980s with power shifts between two main 
political parties (UNP- United National Party and SLFP-Sri Lanka Freedom Party) with 
or without coalition governments have not disregarded the ethnic-problem and a solution 
to the problem. Yet, what is evident is the lack of a single framework with the acceptance 
and cooperation from all societal level for a national level solution. Such unwillingness 
caused massive destruction by killing large number of people and displacing others.   
 
The examination of Norway’s role provides an idea of how a third-party role becomes 
important in the task of peaceful conflict management, especially, in a situation where the 
parties are unable to find a way out on their own. The fact that Norway as a less forceful 
third-party which had no geo-political interest in Sri Lanka was deeply concerned when 
Norway was initiated as the facilitator. The act being less forceful was a benefit for 
enhancing what necessities the warring parties wanted at negotiations. The GoSL was 
careful about not letting the negotiations become a ‘peace-trap’ as experienced with the 
Indian third-party involvement in 1987-1990.  
 
This study showed how parties from the early negotiations upheld different or rather 
exclusive requisitions on Norway’s facilitation. The LTTE on many occasions favored 
more Norwegian participation that in my point of view was an opportunity created to 
secure the LTTE’s recognition during negotiations. This is an obvious case in any other 
internal conflict that less-powerful party (ies) tends to capture a recognized status in 
formal negotiation processes (with/without help of the third-party). Besides the powerful 
party rejects more influences in favor to the weak party. The question of how this power 
equalization should maintained in actual context is both tangible and perceptional. The 
prevailing monopoly of decision-making by the two main stakeholders let Norway within 
‘mere facilitation’ during peace process. This has limited the third-party freedom: their 
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freedom being a space to implement their strategies to best encourage the parties’ 
cooperation. Simply what was evident was the parties maintaining their as a controlling 
factor in determining to what extent Norway should act in the peace process.  
 
The ‘Contingency Model’ which is the basic guiding structure of the study examines the 
facilitation in a broad spectrum by considering the context and process variables. For the 
convenience of the study I infatuated three assumptions: (A:1) Remove or reduce power 
imbalances of the parties (A:2) Strategic choice for tension reduction and (A:3) 
Impartiality towards the conflicting parties. These are considered as the criterion 
variables which explain to what extent Norway has been effective in the Sri Lankan 
peace process. The examination shows how the variables were influential in 
promulgating Norway’s strategic behavior. What is interesting in Bercovitch and 
Huston’s studies is that they look at a number of variables that have been effect on 
meditation outcomes which are practical in actual mediation processes. When using the 
‘Contingency Model’ one can divide these variables into categories such as positive, 
negative and mix-motive variables that turn the degree of the mediation effectiveness. Of 
course, then one can easily observe the main features and characteristics in each context.  
 
The ‘Contingency Model’ has been logical in the discussion of the main assumptions of 
the study. It provided a simple framework for a complex setting. In this sense, the study 
concludes Norway’s facilitation neither failed nor totally accomplished their role in 
almost six years of its association in Sri Lanka’s peace process. The findings are as 
follows: 
 
 Norway’s prime attempt was to be a facilitator that would not lead a forceful outside 
intervention, but to act as a messenger between the GoSL and the LTTE was achieved 
at first. They provided the good-officers and channel service between the parties. 
Norway has remained in the Sri Lanka peace process ‘voluntarily’ for almost a six 
year period from 2002 until January 2008. This is also a significantly lengthy period 
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when compared to the involvement of other third-parties in Sri Lanka’s peace process 
history. India was directly involved in both 1985 and 1987-1990.  
 
 The strategies of Norway’s role were a combination of facilitation and formulation. 
As a facilitator (refer the task of facilitation in Chapter One p.10) Norway was able to 
find a conducive environment for the parties to engage in the bargaining process. This 
was promising in the six-rounds of talks where the parties experienced a long period 
of military confrontation and had no face-to-face negotiations. The six-rounds were 
quite progressive in terms of the parties’ willingness to act on a single institutional 
setting towards a holistic political approach. The talks continued and resulted in 
different initiatives: military, political, humanitarian and developmental. These 
initiatives were used as efficient bargaining tools which was a combination of 
‘general tactics’ and ‘contingency tactics’ at the negotiation process. Norway had 
some important contributions to the negotiations on several occasions. They helped in 
constructing the ceasefire agreement and ceasefire monitoring. They also facilitated 
the six-rounds, Geneva talks, gave support for ‘real peace dividends’ at 
development/reconstruction work and various other financial supports was part of 
Norway’s active role. This enabled the parties creative processes to move from one 
stage to another stage of negotiations.  
 
 Norway’s task of confidence-building (the main task of the facilitator) became less 
effective and insufficient in removing power discrepancies from the parties in Sri 
Lanka.  This was an obvious drawback for guiding talks in the correct direction while 
perusing parties for a common bargaining space. The foremost reasons for such 
drawbacks were Norway’s insufficient knowledge of the conflict and the parties’ 
outlook. Moreover the frequently changing perceptions of the GoSL towards the 
LTTE and vis versa eliminated any possible cooperation for a optimal settlement. 
Despite the fact that Norway continuously communicated between the parties and 
exchanged information which was less fruitful in removing parties’ distrust and 
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suspicion. The main tool of confidence-building between the parties according to the 
Norwegian perspective is the implementation of a mutually agreed truce (2007 
[Interview]). However, the CFA in 2002 was in practice frequently subjected to 
criticism and argumentations. The CFA rather was a tool for adverse bargaining in the 
negotiations and was less effective in terms of leading cooperative moves. As a result 
the parties hardly came up with a comprehensive strategy for peaceful cooperation 
towards a full settlement and they remained discussing preliminary questions related 
to modalities of the CFA and conditions for normalcy (Sri Lanka is an obvious case 
that challenges to mediation theories and models).    
 
 The SLMM did not encompass an active enforcement or commitment for ‘security 
guarantees’ which would influence parties to disengage in truce violations. The 
existence of para-militarism which is run by Karuna fraction in the Eastern part of the 
country added more weight to the SLMM work. It was more difficult to verify sources 
in the Eastern part of the country without proper access to areas. The SLMM had 
logistic and technical difficulties in covering such operations. The stakeholders at 
least had mutual respect over the CFA with the gradual incensement of hostility after 
the sixth-round. As a matter of fact, the SLMM did not receive an enough support by 
the parties. The SLMM was limited when three Scandinavian countries such as 
Sweden, Denmark and Finland had to withdraw from the mission in 2006 upon the 
LTTE’s demand. My examination highlights how the greater intensity of the dispute 
causes failure of the effectiveness of facilitation.  
 
 Norway using procedural strategies in development aid and assistance has been the 
constant guide on ground activities even when the political level of facilitation and the 
SLMM became counterproductive. The stakeholders in the Sri Lankan conflict 
seemed to personalize the Norwegian concessions for a certain extent to be better-off 
and more secure in the consistency during the talks. For example LTTE getting 
concessions made them stay in negotiations and the Sri Lankan government 
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considered the Donors’ contributions as a blessing for their speedy maneuver of 
‘liberal peace’. There has been a number of Donor pledges to the peace process. In 
negotiation theories this identifies ‘inducement strategies’ which make warring parties 
encourage for negotiations. The problematic use of ‘carrots’ was that they were not 
addressing the questions related to security guarantees such as demilitarization and 
demobilization. This perhaps would have led for a stable and secure approach for 
negotiations. 
 
  Norway’s image as an international peacemaker has two dimensional effects to the 
peace process. Firstly, Norway has been accomplished in negotiating a historical 
peace truce in Sri Lanka and Norway was capable of grasping international attention 
to the peace process. They assembled a large number of Donors and established Co-
Chairs for continuous development and reconstruction work. It was a fact that Sri 
Lanka was at the low profile of international consideration for peacemaking (2007 
[Interview]) because of being overturned with Norway’s active involvement as a 
peacemaker. Secondly, the Norwegians being criticized as ‘partial’ alongside their 
reputed peacemaking endeavors. The debates of Norway’s partiality were quite 
unfavorable for the task of confidence-building between the parties and the parties’ 
attitudes towards Norway. It is important to note that my study did not discuss how 
far the debates of Norway’s partiality influenced Norway’s actual behavior due to 
lack of reliable sources. Yet, not surprisingly this is a common pragmatic dilemma for 
any third-party who is from a different geographical and cultural setting involved 
especially in an internal conflict that has its own ethno-politico and military elements. 
Therefore, what would be important and noteworthy for Norwegians to consider is the 
mass discursive ideological perceptions from their external peacemaking initiatives 
perhaps will win mass support for sustainable peacemaking.  
 
 
 
 79 
BIBILOGRAPHY 
 
Books and Reports 
 
Balasingham, Anton (2004). War and Peace; Armed Struggle and Peace Efforts of 
Liberation Tigers, England: Fairmax Publishing Ltd. 
 
Bastian, Sunil (2005). “The Economic Agenda and the Peace Process” in Part of the Sri 
Lanka Strategic Conflict Assessments 2005 (2000-2005) Vol.5, prepared for the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK in collaboration with The Asia Foundation & World 
Bank, Sri Lanka: The Asia Foundation.  
 
Beardsley, Kyle C., David M.Quinn, Bidisha Biswas & Jonathan Wilkenfeld (February 
2006). “Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes” in Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
Vol.50 (1), 58-86.    
 
Bercovitch, Jacob & Allison Huston (1995). “The Study of International Mediation: 
Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence” in Jacob Bercovitch (ed.) Resolving 
International Conflicts, U.S.A: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
Bose, Sumantra (2007). Contested Land War and Peace in Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, 
Bosnia, Cyprus and Sri Lanka, London: Harvard University Press. 
 
Carr, E.C. (1961). What is History?, London: Penguin, 7-30. 
 
Carnevale, Peter J.D. (1986). “Strategic Choice in Mediation” in Negotiation Journal 
Vol.2, New York: Plenum Publishing Corp, 41-56. 
 
 80 
Chandrakathan, A.J.V. (2006). “The Dynamics of Inter-Ethnic Political Integration and 
Disintegration: A Century of Sinhala-Tamil Conflict and Peace-making in 
Retrospect” in Envisioning New Trajectories for Peace in Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka: 
Centre for Just Peace and Democracy, 31-37. 
 
Fernando, Austin (2006). “The Peace Process and Security Issues” in Kumar Rupesinghe 
(ed.) Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, Failures & Lessons Vol. 2, Sri Lanka: 
The Foundation for Co-Existence, 41-92.    
  
Goodhand, Jonathan & Bart Klem with Dilrukshi Fonseka, S.I. Keethaponcalan & 
Shonali Sardesai (2005). “Aid, Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka 2000-2005”, 
Part of the Sri Lanka Strategic Conflict Assessments 2005 (2000-2005) Vol.1, 
prepared for the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK in collaboration with The Asia 
Foundation & World Bank, Sri Lanka: The Asia Foundation.  
 
Gooneratne, John (2007). Negotiating with the Tigers (LTTE) (2002-2005) A View from 
the Second Raw, Sri Lanka: Stamford Lake (Pvt) Ltd. 
 
Hauge, Wenche (February 2004). Norwegian Peace-building Policies: Lessons Learnt 
and Challenges Ahead, Norway: The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
Habeeb, William, Mark (1988). “Power and Negotiation” in Power and Tactics in 
International Negotiation: How Weak Nations Bargain with Strong Nations, U.S.A: 
John Hopkins University Press, 10-26. 
 
Hopmann, P. Terrence (1996). “The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of 
International Conflicts”, U.S.A: University of South Carolina Press, 24-274.  
 
 81 
Hoyle, Rick H., Monica Harris and Charles M. Judd (2002). Research Methods in Social 
Relations, (seventh edition) Boston: Thomson Learning Inc, 3-44 & 75-95. 
 
Kleibore, Marieke (June 1996). “Understanding Success and Failure of International 
Mediation” in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.40(2), 360-389. 
 
Liyanage, Sumanasiri (2005). “Right of Self-Determination in Diverse Societies: The 
Case of Sri Lanka” in Jayadeva Uyangoda (ed.) Conflict, Conflict Resolution and 
Peace Building, Sri Lanka: University of Colombo, 120-148. 
Merriam, Sharan (1998). Qualitative research and case study applications in education, 
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.  
Moolakkattu, John Stepan (2005). “Peace Facilitation by Small States: Norway in Sri 
Lanka” in Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 40 (4), 385-402. 
 
Nachmias, Chava F. & David Nachmias (2005). Research Methods in the Social 
Sciences, (fifth edition), U.K: St. Martin’s Press. 
 
Pillar, Paul R. (1983). “The Dynamics of Concession” in Negotiating Peace: War 
Termination as a Bargaining Process, U.S.A: Princeton University Press, 90-143. 
 
Pruitt, Dean G. (1997). “Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks” in International 
Negotiation, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 237-250. 
 
Ramasamy, Palanisamy (2006). “Strategies for Peace: Comparing Ache with Sri Lanka in 
Envisioning New Trajectories for Peace in Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka: Centre for Just 
Peace and Democracy, 171-180. 
 
 82 
Rampton, David & Asanga Welikala (2005). “The Politics of the South” in Part of the Sri 
Lanka Strategic Conflict Assessments 2005 (2000-2005), Vol.3, prepared for the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK in collaboration with The Asia Foundation & World 
Bank: Sri Lanka: The Asia Foundation.  
 
Schneider, Gerald, Jacob Bercovitch & Torsten J. Selck (March 2006). “The Dispute or 
the Mediator? Structural and Personal Factors in Mediation” in Annual Meeting of the 
International Studies Association, San Diego.  
  
Sebenius, James K. (2002). “International Negotiation Analysis” in V.A. Kremenyuk & 
V. Kremenyuk (eds.) International Negotiation Analysis, Approaches and Issues, 
U.S.A: Jossey Bass Inc. 
Shanmugaratnam, N. & K. Stokke (2008). “Development as a Precursor to Conflict 
Resolution: A Critical Review of the Fifth Peace Process in Sri Lanka” in N. 
Shanmugaratnam (ed.) Between War & Peace in Sudan & Sri Lanka - Deprivation & 
Livelihood Revival, Oxford: James Currey, 93-115.  
Uyangoda, Jayadeva (2005). “Negotiation for Conflict Resolution: Lessons from Sri 
Lanka’s Past Experiences” in Jayadeva Uyangoda (ed.) Conflict, Conflict Resolution 
and Peace Building, Sri Lanka: University of Colombo, 308-352. 
 
Uyangoda, Jayadeva (2006). “Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: Root Causes” in Envisioning 
New Trajectories for Peace in Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka: Centre for Just Peace and 
Democracy, 9-12. 
  
Wakkumbura, Menik (2007). “Development of Modern Buddhist Nationalism in 
Contemporary Politics, and its Involvement in Conflict Reconciliation in Sri Lanka” 
IRINI, Norway: University of Oslo, 55-60. 
 83 
Walter, Barbara, F. (2002). Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil War, 
U.S.A: Princeton University Press. 
 
Yin, Robert, K. (1994). “Introduction and Designing Case Studies” in Case Study 
Research Design and Methods, (second edition) London: Sage Publication Ltd. 
 
Zartman, I. William & Jeffrey Z. Rubin (2000). Power and Negotiation, U.S.A: 
University of Michigan Press, 3-28 & 271-293. 
 
 
Oral Sources  
 
Bauer, Jon, Hannsen (2007). Interview, 23. November.  
The interviewee is Norwegian Special Envoy for the Peace Process in Sri Lanka 
(2006-2008). 
 
Brattskar, Hans (2007). Interview, 24. July.  
The interviewee is the former Ambassador to Sri Lanka (2003 –2007). 
 
Gooneratne, John (2007). Interview, 23. July. 
The interviewee is the former Deputy Secretary- General in SCOPP, Sri Lanka (2002 
-2006) and the author of Negotiating with the Tigers (LTTE) (2002- 2005): A View 
from the Second Row. 
 
Sjoberg, Geir (2008). Interview, 27. February. 
The interviewee is a former Political Advisor to Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission 
(SLMM). 
 
 
 84 
Stangeland,Tomas (2007). Interview, 1. November. 
The interviewee is an Advisor to Section for Peace and Reconciliation: Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Norway. 
 
 
Web Sources  
All the sources have re-accessed on 4th of May 2008 
 
BBC News (2008). “Sri Lanka Truce Violations Recorded”, 2.April, [online]: 
URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2116534.stm  
 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka (2004). “Annual Report”, [online] :  
URL: www.cbsl.gov.lk 
 
Daily Mirror (2008). “Govt. Withdraws from the CFA”, 2. January, [online]:  
URL: http://www.dailymirror.lk/DM_BLOG/Sections/frmNewsDetailView.aspx?ARTID=2820 
 
Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka, [online]:  
URL: http://www.statistics.gov.lk/ 
 
De Silva, K.M., To Restore Peace to Sri Lanka’s Fractured Polity, [online]: 
URL: http://www.peaceinsrilanka.org/insidepages/background/background.asp 
 
Development Cooperation between Norway and Sri Lanka, (August 2005), [online]: 
URL: http://www.norway.lk/Development/Bistand+oversikt.htm 
 
 85 
Helgesen, Vidar (September 2002). “Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs address at 
the Inaugural Session of Sri Lanka Peace Talks”, in First Session of Peace Talk 
[online]:  
URL: http://www.norway.lk/peace/peace/peace/peace.htm 
 
Helgesen, Vidar (May 2003). Peace, Mediation and Reconciliation: The Norwegian 
Experience [online]: 
URL: http://www.irri-kiib.be/speechnotes/02-03/030521-Vidar%20Helgesens.pdf  
 
Hennayake, Shantha K. (May 1991). in The Journal of Asian Studies, 440-442, [online]: 
URL:http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0021-
9118(199105)50%3A2%3C440%3AECARIS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O 
 
Jayantha Dhanapala speaks at the book launch of “Negotiating with the Tigers (LTTE) 
(2002-2005) A View from the Second Row” [online]: 
 URL:http://www.jayanthadhanapala.com/content/frwritingstatements/A_shove_from_the_second_ro
w.pdf 
 
Kelleher, Ann & James Larry Taulee (2006). Bridging the Gap; Building Peace 
Norwegian Style, Peace History Society and Peace and Justice Studies Association, 
[online]:  
URL:http://www.blackwellsynergy.com/action/showPdf?submitPDF=Full+Text+PDF+%28107+KB
%29&doi=10.1111%2Fj.1468-0130.2006.00388.x&cookieSet=1  
 
Kemper, Barbara (2007). Mediation in Intrastate Conflicts [online]:  
  URL: http://inef.uni-due.de/page/documents/Report88.pdf   
 
Moore, Christopher (book summary), The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for 
Resolving Conflict [online]: 
URL: http://www.beyondintractability.org/booksummary/10403/ 
 
 86 
Ramsbotham, Oliver (2005). The Analysis of Protracted Social Conflict: A Tribute to 
Edward Azar, British International Studies Association [online]:  
URL:http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FRIS%2FRIS31_01%2FS0260210505006
327a.pdf&code=3fa447c1aa21cb96454f2789ffa4ab4d 
 
“Report on CERF in Sri Lanka 2006”, United Nations [online]:  
URL:http://ochaonline.un.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1757 
 
Rudrakumaran, Visuvanathan (July 2005). Asymmetries in the Peace Process: the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [online]:  
URL: http://www.ltteps.org/?folder=3&view=821 
 
Shastri, Amita (Jan-Feb 2002). “Sri Lanka in 2001: Year of Reversals” in Asian Survey, 
Vol. 42(1), 177-182, [online]:  
URL:http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0004-
4687(200201%2F02)42%3A1%3C177%3ASLI2YO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U 
 
Sri Lankan Government’s Secretariat for Co-ordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP), 
“CFA Violations at a Glance”, [online]: 
URL: http://www.peaceinsrilanka.org/peace2005/Insidepage/AtaGlance/Ceasefire.asp 
 
Sri Lankan Government’s Secretariat for Co-ordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP), 
“The Agreement on a Ceasefire Between the Government of the Democratic Socialist 
Republic of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam”, [online]: 
URL:http://www.peaceinsrilanka.org/insidepages/Agreement/agceasefire.asp 
 
“Statement by the Head of Delegation at the opening session of talks with the LTTE in 
Geneva” ( 22 February. 2006), [online]: 
URL:http://www.peaceinsrilanka.org/peace2005/Insidepage/PressRelease/GOSLreleases/GOSLmedi
aRel220206.asp 
 
 87 
Statistics Norway (Statistisk Sentralbyra) “Imigration and Immigrants”,[online]: 
URL:http://www.ssb.no/emner/02/01/10/innvbef/tab-2007-05-24-05.html 
 
TamilNet (2000). “Tigers declare ‘good-will’ month-long ceasefire”,(21.December), 
[online]:  
URL:http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=5673 
 
TamilNet (2006). “Geneva Talks II Begins” (28 October), [online]: 
URL: http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=20053 
“Tamil Tigers Must Stop Violent Attacks, State's Burns Says-Under Secretary Calls on 
Sri Lankan Government to Respect Tamil Rights” (2006) in America.gov: Telling 
America’s Story (23 January), [online]:  
URL:http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-
english/2006/January/20060123165358ndyblehs0.9939997.html 
 
“Tokyo Declarationon Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka” (2003) in The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) (10 June), [online]: 
URL: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/srilanka/conf0306/declaration.html 
 
World Watch Institute, The Casualties of Sri Lanka Intensifying War [online]: 
URL:http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5184 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 88 
APPENDIX 
 
Questionnaire(s) presented at the interviews:  
There are three sets of questioners. Each interviewee received a one set of questionnaire within their specialization.  
 
Set 1: Questions 1 to 8. 
1) Norway is reputed as an international peace broker. It is the first foreign country 
outside South Asia to be accepted by both conflicting parties as a facilitator for peace 
negotiations in Sri Lanka. According to your opinion, what significant characteristics 
Norway had for being accepted?  
 
2) There have been various contributions from the Norwegian government as the official 
facilitator. How do you explain the Norwegian role in the process of facilitation for a 
political level solution? 
 
3) It is argued that third-party mediation for a settlement will likely to be successful 
upon its timing. Do you think the parties entered in to negotiation when they were in a 
deadlock/ stalemate? Do you think this was the ‘right time’ to seek a settlement? 
 
4) Facilitation for peace negotiations requires long-term commitment, patience and sense 
of prudence. How do you explain these qualities in Norway’s role? 
 
5) Impartiality and neutrality is considered as one of the core characteristics of any third-
party involved in peace negotiations. There has been an increase debate considering 
Norway’s facilitation as ‘partial’. How do you respond to these debates related to 
Norway’s partiality?  
 
6) Do you think development of such kind of a negative image derails Norway’s 
facilitation in the peace process? 
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7) Can one interpret there is a significant reduction of Norway’s attempts in their 
involvement to pursue the peace process in the current context.. Under such 
circumstances, what kind of an approach, do you think is suitable for Norway in 
convincing conflicting parties to re-start peace talks? 
 
8) Can Norway in the current situation provide the ‘right’ kind of third party service? 
(clarification: reward for cooperative behaviors and punish for hostile acts) 
 
 
Set 2: Questions 1to 12. 
1) How Norway helped to make the CFA?  
 
2) What were the practical difficulties faced when consulting the GoSL and the LTTE at 
the work of drafting the CFA?   
 
3) Does Norway’s facilitation follow any theoretical model? 
 
4) What kind of tools and methods are generally used by Norway to keep the GoSL and 
the LTTE on the negotiation track? 
 
5) Norway acts as the coordinator of the donor community after November 2002. How 
do you explain this role? 
 
6) How important the relationship between Norway and the Donor Community in 
peacemaking in Sri Lanka? 
 
7) How do you assess your work at Co- Chairs? 
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8) What approach Norway used to create an atmosphere to re-start negotiations in 
Geneva 2006? 
 
9) Has there been any change(s) of Norway’s role and/or activities in Geneva talks? 
 
10) What were the constraints faced in Geneva talks? 
 
11) What were the important initiatives took after Geneva talks? 
 
12) Do you perceive the following characteristics in Norway’s role? How do you explain 
them? 
“Formulation often involves with procedural tactics by establishing how negotiations 
will be structured. Formulators can focus attention on the important issues at hand and 
influence which of a number of possible agreements with ultimately reach for 
equilibrium. Formulator will also try to convince each party that there are temporal 
constrains that necessitate immediate progress or that unilateral action is less beneficial 
than negotiation (Beardsley, Kyle & et.al.2006 “Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes” in 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50 (1), 64.  
 
Set 3: Questions 1 to 5. 
1.  In your opinion, how the SLMM benefited to the CFA?  
 
2. What were the main achievements of the SLMM?  
 
3. What were the challenges to the SLMM?   
 
4. How do you explain the instrumental strength of the SLMM? Did it sufficiently help to 
monitor and report ceasefire violations? 
 
5. How did the reduction of the SLMM staff (leaving Sweden, Denmark and Finland out 
at the SLMM) in 2006 affected to overall work of the SLMM? 
